Thursday, December 17, 2009

Lebanon not ready for radical reform



December 15, 2009

Palm Beach Gardens:

In attempting to reform their state, the Lebanese fear the unraveling of their nation.

President Obama was well briefed on Lebanon’s fragile “national unity” government when he received the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman on December 14. In private, the US president demanded from Suleiman that he control Hizbulla’s growing military power. Suleiman, as advised in advance, raised the issue of Israel’s threats to Beirut’s sovereignty in response. Both sides agreed to ignore the negative. Obama is getting better and better at ignoring the elephant in the room. Remember? In dealing with Prime Minister Netanyahu, Obama smoothly shelved the unpleasant: Israel’s settlers in the Occupied Territories.

Washington is learning. Obama is aware that Hizbulla’s unruliness in Lebanon is a symptom of the sectarian power structure of the country. Hizbulla is both a Resistance movement and a Shiite political party. Hizbulla , like Hamas, is also a product of a festering peace process.

Lebanon is a nation of contradictions. It is ironically the most secular and the most sectarian country in the region. The Lebanese are socially integrated and politically segregated. Lebanese communities mix in daily living, but political power is shared according to sectarian, demographic formulas.

Christians and Muslims in Lebanon attend the same schools; they do business and leisure together without much thinking of social background; they live in mixed residential neighborhoods. Lebanon demonstrates that human contact reduces prejudice.

On the other hand, the Lebanese vote, organize power and manage conflict in predictable sectarian patterns. Political systems that conceive society as categories of religious communities create, reinforce and deepen sectarianism in voting, running for office, forming parties and engaging in public service.

If the Lebanese citizenry is to be fully integrated, electoral, personal and family laws have to change. It is the law that rationalizes prejudice and institutionalizes discrimination.

The Lebanese have worked hard to rebuild their country after the fifteen-year sectarian civil war that ended in 1990. Not surprisingly, the current system has its advocates; proponents of the status quo see it as a pragmatic solution, a compromise between Western democracy and widespread Arab autocracy. But the system has to change; demography changes and undermines the equilibrium of power sharing.

"Change" is easier said than done. There is no public trust that under a secular electoral system people would vote for the best qualified politicians and ignore leaders of their own sect. There is no agreement on the role of the Lebanese Diaspora in nation building. Determining who should vote in future national elections could turn into a sectarian “fight”. Finally, secularizing implies loss of privilege to the religious establishment. The clergy wield immense political power; they profit from regulating daily life in education, politics, marriage, death and inheritance.

Nonetheless, the Lebanese could now take preparatory measures to soften attitudes regarding diversity.

§ Lebanon could rotate top leadership positions among the main confessional groups for a fixed period, say a decade or two. This measure would equate the political status of communities and allow for reconciliation and frank exchange about past inequality.

§ Emigrants with Lebanese passports could vote and participate in the rebuilding and reform. When emigrants were allowed to vote, minority and emigrant communities would regain confidence in Lebanon as being a society that values all citizens.

§ The school curriculum could offer national civic education and encourage respect for tolerance. In Lebanon, private schools generally offer better education than public facilities, but intensive privatization in education has side effects; some special schools impart conservative religious education and promote a biased understanding of national history. Public education could be an equalizer; its facilities and curriculum could be improved. Civic education should be uniform across the country.

§ Inter-religious and civil marriage could be accepted. Current Lebanese law recognizes civil marriages only if they are initially registered outside the country, and religious laws are prohibitive in peculiar ways. A Muslim woman cannot marry a Christian man; but a Muslim man can marry a Christian women. Chrstian men and women are prohibited from wedding Muslims. If mixed marriage were legalized as an “ecumenical" or civil union, the country would have a sea change in interfaith attitudes. Since personal and family statutes are based on interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, this aspect of legislation would be hard to change, but elements of it might be introduced incrementally.

It would take perhaps a full generation to change attitudes and systems before the politics of secular voting could be introduced. Regrettably, the Lebanese are not yet mentally ready for a radical departure from their sectarian status quo.

Swiss Ban Minarets


Palm Beach Gardens, December 5, 2009

The freedom to express symbols in the place of worship is an important part of religious rights guaranteed by all democratic societies. Now, Switzerland has one thing in common with Saudi Arabia.

The Swiss referendum vote to ban erection of minarets is reminiscent of Saudi Arabia’s banning of church buildings. The Saudis do not mind Christians conducting worship services in school buildings but they do not tolerate church buildings. There is a strange parallel here: banning minarets in a country that celebrates diversity and banning church buildings in a country that celebrates cultural purity.

The Swiss vote was a result of fear rather than hate. This judgmental decision on Islamic architecture reflects society’s fear of a growing Muslim minority in the land of William Tell. The anxiety is not irrational or unique; Europe and the wider Western world worry about changing Muslim demographics and mobilize ethnocentric politics. While anxiety about integration of Muslim minorities in Western society is understandable, regressive policies to force integration of minorities or to slow immigration of foreigners will backfire. Provoking the hesitant immigrant reinforces his/her isolation.

To facilitate social integration, the host country must understand the culture of its minorities and respect their sentiments. Muslim immigrants are much attached to their religion, and why not. For Muslims, especially their migrants, religion may also be a way of life. Banning minarets in Western mosques would risk alienating Muslims from larger society in adopted countries.

The newly introduced minaret policy is problematic in more ways than imagined. The policy is provocative to the global Muslim community, is in violation of European sentiments on long standing religious freedoms and works against Western interests in the Muslim world.

Minarets are powerful symbols to all Muslims, even to the many adherents who do not habitually visit mosques. The result of this referendum is seen an act of cultural suppression, a slap in the face.

The Arabic word for Minaret is Mi’zana, which means tower for calling the faithful to prayer. The minaret is the equivalent of the church altar for Christians. In a sense, the Mi’zana is symbolically the face of the mosque.

The banning of minarets sends a special message of rejection to the tens of millions of European Muslims. The ban of this symbol adds the minaret to an expanding list of Islamic codes that evoke limitless debate in Europe. Europe is moving on an obsessive track of debate over non substantial issues: the veil, the Danish cartoon, the minaret and who knows what next? Xenophobic politicians and media anchors that lust for emotionally divisive issues have now a new story to spin, the minaret.

The social context is relevant in this story. Five percent of the Swiss are Muslim; most Swiss Muslims are partially or fully naturalized refugees from the Balkans. They are largely of a secular mindset. Switzerland is the seat the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, UNHCR, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, UNHRC. Switzerland is among the leading nations in religious tolerance and respect for human rights. The result of this referendum is at odds with the Swiss culture of tolerance.

The West works hard to secure military presence in the Middle East and elsewhere on Muslim territories. Western governments search with diligence for new ways to win the hearts and minds of Muslims in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The West invests heavily in public diplomacy to create a culture of exchange and understanding with Arabs and Muslims. Banning minarets in the heart of Europe undermines the strategic Western interests in the Muslim world.

Identity building promotes security and is the foundation of integration. Minarets are “flags” of identity that should enhance social integration rather than impede it.

The West must continue to honor its high standards of respect for religious diversity. Minarets are not threatening but banning them may have that effect. This ban will soon be challenged within Swiss society and by the European Union.

Lebanese tension expressed in demand for reform


December 9, 2009

Palm Beach Gardens

The Lebanese have worked hard to rebuild their country after a fifteen-year civil war that ended in 1990. They do not seem ready now to take radical steps of reform.


In order of size, the three main religious communities of
Lebanon are Shiites, Christians and Sunni. The president of the Republic and the chief of army must be Maronite (Catholic) Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the parliament speaker a Shiite Muslim. Christians, roughly a third of the resident population, are allotted by law half of the parliament membership.

With poor leadership, weak democratic parties and rival neighbors, Lebanon risks its future in seeking real reform. The state structure is built around confessional balance and religion is a badge of identity. The religious institutions register and sanction birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, burial and inheritance.

Religious leaders and their political patrons are not willing to lose their grip on their communities. Personal and family law is the foundation of the system. Religious institutions help shape the identity of the individual; the political system reinforces this sectarian identity. The positions in parliament, the cabinet, the army leadership and the government top jobs are prescribed by sectarian quotas.

Shiites, the majority in Lebanon, are underrepresented in the parliament and in the government. To compensate, they have gradually created a “state-within-a-state”, by forming a party with a strong military arm and a social security network: Hizbullah.

The Sunnis have lost clout in recent years. The former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, who was murdered in 2005, led the rebuilding of the country after the civil war. His son, Sa’ad, is now the Prime Minister. Sa’ad is unable to fill his father’s shoes as he is less experienced and connected in the region.

In the past, sectarian tension existed largely between Christians and Muslims. Now, the center of rivalry is between the Shiites and Sunnites. Christian leadership split; one side is with the Sunnite political block and the other with the Shiites.

As sectarian tension heats up political governance falters. In November, after five months of haggling, a government was finally formed. There are already signs of serious conflict.

Militia power is on the rise. A 30-member cabinet includes two Hizbullah ministers and eight others from the Hizbullah-led opposition front. The cabinet has formally acknowledged that national defense includes the “Resistance”, i.e. Hizbullah.

Lebanon is used to perilous contradictions. The pro-Western segment of the Christian political leadership expressed serious objection to the cabinet’s endorsement of Hizbullah’s armed resistance. The government is well aware that the militia is labeled “terrorist” by the United States. Washington continues to offer military assistance and training to the Lebanese army.

The tension between a Western leaning, “national unity” government and the opposition block- the latter supported by Iran and Syria- is often expressed as struggle for “reform”. The opposition front demands reform of the electoral system to allow better representation of all groups, implying political gain for Shiites. Pro-government Christian leaders ask for the demilitarization of Hizbullah, a measure coded as “secularization of national defense”.

Hizbullah has the strongest armed force but there are other armed groups. There are a Palestinian militia within the refugee camps and an underground fundamentalist militia. The conservative segment of the Maronite Christian community, which had a militia during the civil war, demilitarized its “Lebanese Forces” at the end of this internal war. However, the Lebanese Forces remain active politically and seem prone to reactivate their militia. The future of Hizbullah’s demilitarization is linked with the regional peace process. Hizbullah’s link to Syria, Iran and its commitment to liberate Lebanese land occupied by Israel makes its demilitarization inconceivable today.

The Lebanese should take some measures to safeguard the future. They could take a series of preparatory steps for secularization in the near future. They could rotate top leadership positions among the confessional groups for a decade or two before secularizing. There is no reason why Christians must monopolize the presidency and the Sunnites the premiership. Emigrants with Lebanese passports should vote and participate in the rebuilding and reform. Inter-religious civil marriage should be accepted. The school curriculum should offer civic secular education and encourage respect for tolerance.

Direct measures for secularization will be taken later when the people are ready mentally and the region is more stable. Reforming Lebanon must be planned in stages, executed with a unified effort and be mindful of regional realities

Profiling Arabs and Muslims would backfire

The September 11, 2001, events shocked Arab and Muslim Americans, and the recent tragedy at Fort Hood, Texas, in which Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 people and wounded 30, heightened their identification with the United States. There are signs that Hasan’s acts of terror caused Americans of Middle Eastern and Muslim origin to want to participate more actively in search of ways to combat politically motivated violence in their country.

Today, Arab and Muslim Americans are nervous; they do not wish to see racial profiling become the law of the land. For the state to curb the freedoms of Arab and Muslim Americans, especially the most vulnerable among them, would likely backfire both domestically and abroad.
In the aftermath of the Fort Hood killings, several Arab American publicists underlined the community’s rejection of violence. In The Arab-American News of November 20, Khalil al-Saghir offered this message: “[T]he line must be drawn … between opposing US foreign policies and adhering to ideologies that consider America as a satanic enemy.”

His implication was that explaining away terrorism through simplistic formulas was no longer acceptable. This is not to say that American foreign policy has become palatable to Americans of Middle Eastern or Muslim background. But what is emerging is a new attitude denouncing terror, regardless of political context. As Saghir noted: [T]he question … is what is being done by American Muslims to help identify and ferret out those who are among us who may be the next Nidal Hasan?”

This only echoed what another prominent Arab American, Dr. Philip Salem, had declared earlier in a different setting: “Silence is no more a choice. Muslim extremists are not only a source of danger to the Christian West but rather a serious danger to Islam itself.”
Arab Americans and those of Muslim background are irritated when their loyalty is questioned, and when their disagreement with Washington on the Middle East is confused with a lack of patriotism. Some 5,000 Muslims and Arab Americans fought on both sides of the American Civil War, while over 15,000 Arab Americans fought in World War II.

After Fort Hood, American Muslims’ denunciation of terror and their asking for a role in combating it was appreciated by most Americans. However, some still question the feasibility of fully integrating Muslims into American life. Many argue that the “Islamist” side of Hasan’s behavior could not be overlooked. These skeptics point out that Hasan saw himself as a Muslim first and as an American second.

This line of argument is unfair. I have difficulty imagining that Hasan identified with an Islamic community, or umma, and abandoned America. More likely, he had suffered a mental breakdown, the result of personal maladjustment, professional failure, and political alienation. His anger against US politics distorted his judgment. The war in Iraq, the failure of the peace process, the intensification of military activity in Afghanistan, his exposure to war casualties, a negative self-image, poor job performance, and the fear of his impending deployment to a war zone may have all explained his tragic, cruel and bizarre vengeance.


Fort Hood brought questionable ideas of policy into the mainstream. When Muslims listen to radio talk show host Glenn Beck, they see profiling creeping into mainstream thinking. When they hear Sarah Palin rationalizing profiling, their stomach turns. When they witness Reverend Pat Robertson denying that Islam is a religion, they come to the conclusion that America tolerates anti-Muslim sentiment.
Americans who believe that Muslim minorities in the US should be monitored, screened, and profiled are making their case more loudly today. During times of societal stress, the heightening of vigilance sounds like the remedy of choice in terror control. But exposing “suspect” communities to humiliating attention is morally questionable and counterproductive. The act of profiling interferes with the naturalization and socialization process of minorities. Applying different security standards to different communities is a violation of human rights.

How do we decide which groups are too risky? There are several minority groups in America with extreme elements who place the interests of their small community ahead of those of America. However, the differences within communities are often larger than those between communities. A moderate Palestinian-American has more in common with a liberal Israeli-American than with an American who admires Hamas. A Christian-Zionist has more in common with an Arab American who is an extremist Islamist than with a Presbyterian who supports Peace Now.

Even if society is morally comfortable with targeting a specific community for profiling, the act of singling out people on the basis of their religion or ethnicity is likely to alienate them and transform moderates into radicals.

Society is not helpless in adopting policies to detect those who are likely to commit acts of terror. But, there are limits to the prevention of violence. There will always be openings for a few people to sabotage the security of a society and cause immense damage and cruelty.

Arab and Muslim Americans do not lack patriotism, and have shown this on countless occasions in the past. As serious as the Fort Hood massacre was, and it was very serious, it was more the exception than the rule in illustrating the be­havior of Americans from Middle Eastern or Muslim backgrounds. To ensure that it remains an exception, Arab and Muslim Americans must to be in on the solution, not viewed merely as the problem.