Lebanese tension expressed in demand for reform

December 9, 2009

Palm Beach Gardens

The Lebanese have worked hard to rebuild their country after a fifteen-year civil war that ended in 1990. They do not seem ready now to take radical steps of reform.

In order of size, the three main religious communities of Lebanon are Shiites, Christians and Sunni. The president of the Republic and the chief of army must be Maronite (Catholic) Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the parliament speaker a Shiite Muslim. Christians, roughly a third of the resident population, are allotted by law half of the parliament membership.

With poor leadership, weak democratic parties and rival neighbors, Lebanon risks its future in seeking real reform. The state structure is built around confessional balance and religion is a badge of identity. The religious institutions register and sanction birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, burial and inheritance.

Religious leaders and their political patrons are not willing to lose their grip on their communities. Personal and family law is the foundation of the system. Religious institutions help shape the identity of the individual; the political system reinforces this sectarian identity. The positions in parliament, the cabinet, the army leadership and the government top jobs are prescribed by sectarian quotas.

Shiites, the majority in Lebanon, are underrepresented in the parliament and in the government. To compensate, they have gradually created a “state-within-a-state”, by forming a party with a strong military arm and a social security network: Hizbullah.

The Sunnis have lost clout in recent years. The former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, who was murdered in 2005, led the rebuilding of the country after the civil war. His son, Sa’ad, is now the Prime Minister. Sa’ad is unable to fill his father’s shoes as he is less experienced and connected in the region.

In the past, sectarian tension existed largely between Christians and Muslims. Now, the center of rivalry is between the Shiites and Sunnites. Christian leadership split; one side is with the Sunnite political block and the other with the Shiites.

As sectarian tension heats up political governance falters. In November, after five months of haggling, a government was finally formed. There are already signs of serious conflict.

Militia power is on the rise. A 30-member cabinet includes two Hizbullah ministers and eight others from the Hizbullah-led opposition front. The cabinet has formally acknowledged that national defense includes the “Resistance”, i.e. Hizbullah.

Lebanon is used to perilous contradictions. The pro-Western segment of the Christian political leadership expressed serious objection to the cabinet’s endorsement of Hizbullah’s armed resistance. The government is well aware that the militia is labeled “terrorist” by the United States. Washington continues to offer military assistance and training to the Lebanese army.

The tension between a Western leaning, “national unity” government and the opposition block- the latter supported by Iran and Syria- is often expressed as struggle for “reform”. The opposition front demands reform of the electoral system to allow better representation of all groups, implying political gain for Shiites. Pro-government Christian leaders ask for the demilitarization of Hizbullah, a measure coded as “secularization of national defense”.

Hizbullah has the strongest armed force but there are other armed groups. There are a Palestinian militia within the refugee camps and an underground fundamentalist militia. The conservative segment of the Maronite Christian community, which had a militia during the civil war, demilitarized its “Lebanese Forces” at the end of this internal war. However, the Lebanese Forces remain active politically and seem prone to reactivate their militia. The future of Hizbullah’s demilitarization is linked with the regional peace process. Hizbullah’s link to Syria, Iran and its commitment to liberate Lebanese land occupied by Israel makes its demilitarization inconceivable today.

The Lebanese should take some measures to safeguard the future. They could take a series of preparatory steps for secularization in the near future. They could rotate top leadership positions among the confessional groups for a decade or two before secularizing. There is no reason why Christians must monopolize the presidency and the Sunnites the premiership. Emigrants with Lebanese passports should vote and participate in the rebuilding and reform. Inter-religious civil marriage should be accepted. The school curriculum should offer civic secular education and encourage respect for tolerance.

Direct measures for secularization will be taken later when the people are ready mentally and the region is more stable. Reforming Lebanon must be planned in stages, executed with a unified effort and be mindful of regional realities