Equal Pressure on Hamas and Israel

Pressure on Hamas May Work if Matched by Pressure on Israel
Ghassan Rubeiz, June 14, 2006.

Regrettably, with guns Palestinians debate their planned national referendum on the two- state peace plan. While domestic and international pressure on Hamas mounts, the international community, on the whole, ignores Israel’s extended Palestinian occupation. Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land is not unrelated to Hamas’ hard line policies.
A referendum about Israel’s right to exist within pre-1967 borders has become a fierce contest of wills between Hamas-led government and Palestinian President Abbas. Hamas’ leadership has deliberated and agonized over this referendum. It has calculated the cost of opposing a referendum that demands from it to join the rest of Palestinian society in accepting a two-state solution. Its strategy is to abort the referendum, to make it difficult to administer or render it useless. Hamas is bent on fighting the initiative as it considers it a threat to its legitimacy.
Given the explosive tension that the referendum issue has created among Palestinian military factions, it may be wise to assume that this initiative has partially served its purpose. The initial debate has generated a university public opinion survey that showed that most Palestinians support a two-state solution. The Beer Zeit study revealed that 81 % of Palestinians support peace with Israel with a terminated occupation. The data also showed that Hamas is loosing some of its popularity. Six months ago, Hamas won elections with an impressive majority.
The wisdom of Abbas’s late July referendum is being tested under increasingly questionable circumstances. Under conditions of near civil war and a coercive occupation, the quality of data that would emerge from a hastily planned referendum may not be more accurate than the Beer Zeit University poll.
Where is the referendum leading the Palestinians? As Abbas’ referendum aims to compel Hamas to bow to public opinion, the social climate for opinions to matter disappears. Palestinians are wondering if it is worth risking a domestic street war over a peace plan that Israel is known to have rejected.
Grim political developments are moving beyond the referendum crisis. On June 10, Hamas announced a dramatic decision to terminate a 16-month truce implying that it will resume its military operations against Israel. Linking this escalation to the referendum, it simultaneously accused any Palestinian group that puts policy pressure on it of “being a collaborator with the Israeli occupation”. So Hamas is threatening both Israel and the silent majority of Palestinians who oppose its current unrealistic policy.
A series of analytical questions come to mind. Is Hamas starting to lose control of governance? Or is it simply reacting to a series of Israeli attacks (e.g. Gaza-beach tragedy) that do not spare innocent civilians? Is it feeling too vulnerable to a program of Israeli assassination of targeted Palestinians? Is it exploring an escape from its political predicament by threatening to bring chaos to the Palestinian House? Is Hamas firing political rhetoric in order to rally the Arab street around its “martyrdom”? Are Iran and Syria giving Hamas strong support to face local and international sources of stress? The answer may be a combination of all of these projections.
The battle over the referendum may be a symptom rather than a cause of a wider emerging crisis. A new out break of a Palestinian-Israeli war maybe approaching; a war that could turn into a larger Arab-Israeli confrontation, with Iran and the Muslim world on one side, and the US on the other.
Israeli war strategists view Hamas’ intransigence, Syria’s militia alliances and Ahmadi Najad’s defiant nuclear moves as a pretext for an opportune new war. As long as Hamas keeps its current policies of militant rejection, as long as Israel sees its future security in land acquisition, as long as the “9/11”tragedy continues to fuel American bias in foreign policy and as long as Arab regimes remain divided and incompetent, the Middle East conflict calendar will remain active.
As war risks increase within Palestinian territories and beyond some type of international diplomatic intervention is urgently needed. Is the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and the UN) ready for an intervention that goes beyond starving Hamas out of power? Pressure on Israel should be integrated within a new approach to Hamas and the Road Map to peace. The Palestinian referendum is a path on the Quartet’s “road map” that may disappear due to regional and international neglect.

Multiple Wars in palestine and Iraq

Multiple Wars in palestine and iraq

Lecture at UUC of the Palm Beaches, Florida, June 11, 2006

There are four Palestinian and three Iraq wars, all running simultaneously. Michael Walzer, a “just war” scholar categorizes the Palestinian Israeli conflict in four overlapping wars. Showing the complexity of the conflict, here is how Walzer lists the four wars:
“The first is a Palestinian war to destroy the state of Israel. The second is a Palestinian war to create an independent state alongside Israel, ending the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The third is an Israeli war for the security of Israel within the 1967 borders. The fourth is an Israeli war for Greater Israel, for the settlements and the occupied territories.”
Walzer argues that a resolution of the conflict can take place only when the forces of moderation in on both sides of the conflict (communities behind “second and third war”) cooperate to generate a lasting peace.
Last week, Palestinian President Abbas tried to co-opt Hamas to moderate its stance on Israel and the strategy of future resistance and failed. His plan was to present a united Palestinian partner to negotiate peace with Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert. Hamas rejected the initiative on the basis that Olmert is an “extremist”. Hamas perceives Olmert’s regime in “fourth war” category, not in a moderate, “war three”, position.

Last week’s Israeli air raid on Gaza civilians which killed ten people and injured fifty gave Hamas an added excuse to reject Abbas’ initiative that was presented with a warning. The warning was a referendum that would refer the question of “how to approach Israel” to the Palestinian public, if Hamas did not soften its position. Hamas was so determined; it rejected to change its diplomatic stance and even declared to terminate a self imposed truce of the past 16 months.
In one week, we moved from a possibility of a unity among Palestinians to a possibility of a new war between Palestinians and Israelis. A worse scenario would be a civil war among Palestinians and an Israeli occupation that advances in oppression.

As in Palestine, there are three dimensions of wars in Iraq. In Iraq, there is a war of Islamic Jihadists against an occupation that is perceived as the work of Christian Crusades. Second, there is an ethnic war of Kurds against Arabs. Third, there is a resistance war of militias against a new born state.
Last week’s hunting down of Musab Al Zarkawi was the Jihadi fighting the Crusader war of Bush and Blair. Zarkawi’s elimination weakens the first dimension of the war. Zarkawi’s war is an international war of Muslim activists defending a western intruder, whose image in Muslim history is evil.

The foreign Jihadi elements in Iraq constitute the larger segment of the sectarian terror. The elimination of Zarkawi may be the start of decline of the foreign insurrection. However, while the terror may subside as a result of the gradual weakening of international terrorism, the political problem of Iraq is largely regional and local.

Iraq is part of a deep rooted regional conflict. This conflict is between the Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria, on one hand, and the dominant societies of these four countries. The 2003 Iraq war is the second Gulf war. In 1990, after Saddam occupied Kuwait, the US invaded Iraq and the established a no fly zone in the northern part of the country. This earlier Gulf war weakened Saddam, gave the Kurds autonomy in North Iraq and relieved Iran from regional pressure.

While the Kurdish question is inflamed in Iraq today, it has been simmering for decades; it was deadly in the seventies and eighties in Turkey. Currently a silent Kurdish rebellion is controlled in Northern Syria. The Kurds are fighting a national war of liberation in stages and they are hoping to establish a Kurdistan with a united population of thirty million people.
A federation in Iraq is a step in the right direction for Kurds. The Unity government that has just been sworn in this week is as vulnerable as it can be. The constitution is a basic problem. It lacks a fair distribution of oil revenues. Gender rights are limited and religious authority is too strong. The Shiite community is too dependent on one clerical figure and one strong militia. The new federated state in Iraq has an ethnic fault line that is stronger than the sectarian one.

The third dimension of Iraq’s conflict is local. This is the conflict of state building: a struggle between primordial authority and central secular authority. It is a chaotic race for security among tribes and militias. The invasion of Iraq brutally and quickly obliterated the authority of governance and the army. The invasion turned into an occupation and established an alien administrative set up to replace a political institutional structure.

It is very difficult to have confidence in an occupier that is fast in tearing down and slow in rebuilding. As other traditional and previously colonized societies Iraq’s experience with state authority has been negative. The tribe and its military arm, the militia, develop as substitutes for state authority. The weaker the state and the less credible it is, the stronger is the tribe and the militia. Militia politics is intermingled with government institutions. This is a bad mix of power management.
In Conclusion, as long as the US forces are on Iraqi soil the rebuilding will be problematic. As long as the political solution is weak, the security of Iraq will be poor and trust of the people in the new state will be limited. As long as the region (Egypt and Iran in particular) is in the margin of decision making, the rebuilding of Iraq will be too slow. We are talking years not months before we see a new Iraq.

June 11, 2006

Palestinian Unity Means Hamas Must Deal with Israel

PALESTINIAN UNITY MEANS HAMAS MUST DEAL WITH ISRAEL

By Ghassan Rubeiz Daily Star, Commentary (Lebanon) June 9, 2006

Little is known about a community of several thousand Palestinianpolitical prisoners being held in Israeli jails. These prisonersfollow the news and discuss politics. A West Bank commentator,Daoud Kuttab, has explained that political prisoners are highlyesteemed by Palestinian society. They do not have to prove theirpatriotism.Recently, imprisoned Palestinian leaders issued a document callingfor talks with Israel and (implicitly) recognizing its legitimateexistence. The prisoners were united in calling for moderation andin accepting the June 1967 borders as the boundaries for a futurePalestinian state. In so many words, these leaders, among whom wasa Hamas official, endorsed a two-state solution. Their documentreflected the sentiments of most Palestinians and was based onearlier secretive negotiations between various factions.The prisoners gave Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas anopportunity to propose a reconciliation plan. He has demanded thatHamas join him in peace talks with Israel and endorse an 18-pointnegotiation proposal. Abbas warned the Hamas-led government that ifit rejected the prisoners' proposal he would call for a referendumon the document.Hamas initially refused to accept the prisoners' appeal. On June 4,Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya told reporters that"referendums are not permitted in the Palestinian lands." He cited"Palestinian law and unspecified experts in international law" forthis claim. However, since then, Hamas officials have asked formore time to review the moderation proposal. In response, Abbas'spokesman declared that "the referendum is a political step thatwould help end the siege imposed on the Palestinian people andwould help resume funds and aid to the Palestinian NationalAuthority."Israeli government officials see mixed signs in the prisoners'document, and in the referendum that Abbas intends to organize, andhave refrained from supporting its proposals. Israel perceivesthreats in an initiative that highlights the right of return forPalestinian refugees and the government is not ready to endorsefull withdrawal to the June 1967 borders. This would implyevacuation from all Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories.Increased suffering and loss of land and image should compel thePalestinians to adopt fresh ideas to unite and review the characterof their struggle. The prison document is a face-saving mechanismdesigned to offer Hamas a graceful exit from the diplomatic hole ithas dug for itself, as Israel dictates peace terms, as Abbas asksfor leniency from threatening donor agencies, and as the Arab worldpleads for patience with Hamas. Israel builds a wall of exclusionin the name of security and Hamas builds a wall of rejection in thename of patriotism. Both walls are built on irrational fear.If Hamas cares to heal the rift within its own ranks, to join handswith other Palestinian parties and to respond to the currentsentiments of Palestinian society, it should accept the prisoners'proposal in order to avoid a risky referendum. If the movementwishes to gain international sympathy, to reduce Jewish fears ofcompromise, and to weaken the unilateralist strategy pursued byIsrael, it should be more flexible.While a referendum is a logical consequence of the likely Hamasrejection of the prisoners' document, administering such a pollwill not be easy. A referendum assumes that Hamas can be peacefullydefeated through a formal process of testing opinion. Moreover,Arab public opinion has been rallying around Hamas because of thepunitive Western response that it has faced despite winning ademocratic election. What may be logical may not be politicallyfeasible. A national referendum in the Occupied Territories wouldface cultural, logistical and political hurdles.Will the referendum be a step toward peace or another move towardPalestinian civil war? If Hamas accepts the proposal it would scorea new victory for Palestinian unity and enhance the chances of anempowered nation winning out in its struggle for liberation from anawful occupation.Ghassan Rubeiz is a former secretary of the Middle East at theGeneva-based World Council of Churches.

Lecture: Iraq, Iran and Palestine

IRAQ, IRAN AND PALESTINE CONNECTIONS
Ghassan Michel Rubeiz, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, June 4, 2006
Lecture outline

The US is mixed up in a three interactive conflict areas, namely, Iraq, Iran and Palestine.

First Iraq:

1. 9/11 gave the neo conservative power in US. They conceived in 9/11 an open sesame policy. With a 9/11 pass-par-tous key the Neos entered Afghanistan and then Iraq. Fighting international terrorism was less urgent than solving the Arab Israeli conflict with force.

2. Invasion of Iraq was designed to come closer to the sources of “evil” in the region: Saddam Hussein, Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hizbullah, Syrian and Iranian regimes. This approach is dictating the peace process.

3. Results counterproductive: Hamas is ruling; Hizbullah strongest power in Lebanon; Syrian regime received an extension of legitimacy after being on life support conditions; Iran gets a new Kaddafi figure in Ahmadinajad.

4. US reacts by staying the course in Iraq, following an eradication policy of privation in Palestine and creating a Security Council resolution ( 1959) to deal with Syrian regime and with Hizbullah . US lobbies heavily for Sanctions on Iran at UN, with a subtle warning for an air attack should sanctions fail.

5. Hizbullah, Hamas, Ahmedinajad, Syria’s Assad and Iraq’s Sadr form an informal alliance against the two adversaries: US and Israel.

Iraq is a quagmire occupation with no clear vision on what to do and how to leave a broken country that was bad and now is awful; thanks to a war without preparation, a war without reason, a war without a chance for a positive ending and a war against a solution.

Ultimately the Iraqi army will be able to quiet the rebellion. We do not know how long it will take? No immediate solution appears. The sooner the US army leaves the more likely the solution will appear. The solution will materialize locally with some help from the region and with participation of international good will. Iran can play a negative or a positive role, depending how confident it feels and how much it is in conflict with the US and Israel.
Iraq’s unity is hard to bring back. The Kurdish autonomy is irreversible, but not the Shiite/ Sunnite connection. The latter rift between Muslims of Iraq is reversible, given a common language, same religion, frequent intermarriages and a strong Arab identity.
6. A regional conference may help bring the major Arab countries and Iran into the decision making process. But that would require thawing of tense relations between the the US and Iran.




US AND IRAN RELATIONS
Iran issues for US
- Threat of future US attack
- Demonization: No language of respect
- Finance issues: blocking of accounts
- Palestine: a wailing wall on demand?
- Israel and Iran: the two new superpowers

US issues for Iran
Hizbullah: unruly on border with Israel and model for other Islamic militants internationally
Hamas: a hybrid of Hizbullah and Egypt’s Islamic brotherhood
Nuclear militarization: Nixon’s mistake to allow the region to have an exception in Israel is here to haunt us now. Iran wants parity with Israel on Nuclear power and it wants security from US and Israel.
Threat to Israel: Israel has ironically made itself more vulnerable by acquiring the nuclear bomb as a holocaust reflex
Human rights: Iran is an electoral democracy, with weak separation of constitutional powers

The US has not acknowledged Iran’s emerging political status yet. Iran today, enjoys formidable political power in the Middle East. This country is a prime mover in Iraq (Shiite power) a player in Afghanistan recovery (border country), an ally of Syria and a close partner of Hamas and of Hezbollah. Moreover, increased oil revenues have reinforced its government’s influence within and outside its borders. Iran is also a leader of the Shiite political revival. It claims ascendancy in Islamic statehood ideology and resistance against Westernization, not modernization. In the Muslim world, Iran today, outranks Egypt, Turkey, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, in political influence.

Facing so much difficulty in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US may have to radically shift its Iran and larger Middle East policy. A visionary US foreign policy requires three new elements:

A. Intense high level dialogue with the Iranian regime,
B. Creative program of exchange with Iranian society
C. Fair response to Iranian related Middle East trouble spots.

There are plenty of reasons for the US to dislike the post Shah Iranian autocratic regimes: e.g. the hostage ordeal, support of militia activities abroad, militant theocracy and vociferous anti Israel politics. Similarly, Iranians, have their own reasons to dislike American policies. The US is seen as an imperialist power. There is wide evidence showing US strong meddling in internal Iranian affairs over the last six decades. The US military shadow over Iran is heavy. As a punitive measure, since the mid nineties, the US legislators have placed selective sanctions on trade with Iran. The US trade sanctions have not worked well since many countries have mutual interest in dealing with this oil producing country. The US has demonized Iran since the Hostage crisis.
Neither the US or Iran can fairly claim that their crisis today is solely caused by the other side. US dialogue with Iran may need to be secretive, comprehensive and bilateral. It should cover at least the following issues: nuclear development, Iraq’s stability, Middle East peace, Hezbollah and Hamas. There is now too much pride and rage on both sides to allow face to face candid and comprehensive dialogue.
But insecurity softens pride. If Iraq turns into a deeper quagmire, US reconciliation with Iran may become a priority. And if the Iranian rulers run into a growing domestic crisis, they may seek accommodation with the US. Dialogue does not look like a realistic option now.

The second dimension for a new diplomacy is fostering international cultural exchange with the people of Iran. The US is not building sound socio cultural ties with internal Iranian reformers. Instead of encouraging Iranian people to people exchange, the US is slowing cultural, economic and educational sharing with Iran. If the Soviet transition to democracy is a model, containment of the Islamic regime would allow time and opportunity for the reformers to mobilize. Given appropriate Western support, Iranian society has a promising potential for generating a new post Khomeini revolution, blending authentic Islam with modernity, separating the state from religious authority without total secularization. One can not predict the pace and quality of social change in a transitional society like Iran. But Iran remains an excellent candidate for achieving a future Islamic renaissance, given its historical experience with freedom, its youthful demography, intellectual aspirations and rich economic resources.

Iran is at the political nerve center of the Middle East. US foreign policy should alter its approach to other urgent problems in the region in order to restore harmony between the US and the Arabs, and with Iran.
Accelerating departure from Iraq will help enhance America’s relations in the region. Coordinated planning with Iran to enhance Iraq’s future stability would be a confidence building measure. Reviving the Arab Israeli peace process is crucial. Through a US rejuvenated Middle East peace process that includes the Syrian Golan Heights, Hezbollah and Hamas may be enticed to integrate their militias in the national armies of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, respectively.

Ironically, the US foreign policy in the Middle East has significantly strengthened Iran thus creating a precarious American-Persian power tension. For its own survival and for the region’s wellbeing, the current US Administration needs a new Middle East peace “road map” that runs through Tehran.




PALESTINE ISRAEL CONFLICT

Unilateral Withdrawal and Wall of exclusion are unhealthy and non lasting measures
Palestinians should read the sign on the wall and start using their greatest assets, namely, human rights, empowerment of their people and staying power. Time is on their side.
Progressive Israelis should seek this moment of opportunity to achieve a realistic two-state solution based on 1967 borders.
The recent Abbas- Prison-reformists referendum initiative may have a chance to turn the tide against militant Hamas
The referendum may empower secular and peace oriented Palestinians, but will the US and Israel support a 1967 framework for peace?

Fundamentalist groups thrive on pressure and religious mobilization operates on renewable political energy. Will the referendum cost Abbas what he has left of his political power? It is still too early to bury the referendum initiative, but Abbas' move is an indication that Palestinians are struggling to get out of a political stalemate. In Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's speech last week to the United States Congress, there were threats of terminating the peace process, leaving Palestinians hanging at the mercy of future Israeli hegemony.
What choices do Palestinians have today facing an adversary whose demands are unconditional surrender? Palestinians face grave asymmetry of power with the occupier. They are backed by feeble Arab regimes and they are threatened by crippling divisions of ideology. Will Olmert's speech force Palestinians to swallow their pride and become politically more discerning and future-oriented?
The choice of militant resistance assumes that Palestinians will achieve victory through war, with or without rules of combat. Militant leaders dream of bringing Israel to its knees. Hamas and Islamic Jihad mobilize young men through religious symbols, demand unlimited Palestinian sacrifice, count on expanding demographic power and calls for increased Arab support. Is this form of struggle working?
Israel's occupation is gradually turning into annexation, while the international image of Palestinians is not improving. Without intending to bring about such a thing, the nature of chaotic Palestinian military strategy extends the life of Israel's hegemony.
Palestinian political leadership has been divided and fratricidal. The toll of human suffering has been too harsh, especially on civilians and children. Militant ideologues ignore the fact that liberation is about state building, not only about regaining land. Authoritarian leadership and closed ideologies do not generate mature political independence. Extreme ideologues are not mindful that Palestinians are fighting an unrealistic war against a regional superpower, backed by a global superpower. Too many Palestinians are choosing to fight and lose, to fight more and lose more. For how long will militant Palestinian ideologues perceive victory in failure?
Since peace is not realistic in the near future, Palestinians should develop a longer-term strategy of popular civic resistance. Israel will enjoy for the near future a political honeymoon of hegemony in the absence of an international mechanism to enforce justice. But through its ruthless occupation Israel is sowing the seeds of corrosion of its own political system. Israel will not be able in the long run to cope with the consequences of its occupation of Palestinian territory.
Is it time for Palestinians to recognize the power of civic resistance in order to reverse the occupation with political organization? In recent times, popular resistance worked well in South Africa, in Eastern Europe, in Ireland and elsewhere. It can work for the Palestinians. But in order for civic resistance to work well, the Palestinians need to unite, embrace the rule of law in their struggle and open links with peace partners within Israel and outside.
Palestinians have lost much so far. Yet their unity, moral courage and vulnerability may turn out to be their greatest assets for a brighter future.
Muslims and Arabs in particular, see a cumulative record of hegemony inflicted by the Christian West. The Crusaders occupied the Holy land and they were cruel in dealing with the communities they occupied. They failed to occupy the Middle East for a long time. They left Palestine in the thirteenth century after two hundred year rule of severe damage to Christian Muslim relations. But they reemerged in the 19th century with secular clothes under the Mandate system. They created Christian Lebanon in 1920 , Grand Liban, partly out of Syrian land, declared a Home Rule for a minority Jewish community in Palestine in 1917, carved the border of Iraq for the Sunnites, denied Iran’s Shia independence, and elsewhere ruled indirectly in the Middle East.
In the second half of the Twentieth Century the US replaced Europe as a central player in colonial politics.
In Iran, in 1953, they prevented the Mussadaq democratic government from developing the country, supported a corrupt Shah regime and armed Saddam in his war on the Persian state.
The support of a Jewish state in the Middle East contributed to the growth of revival of Islamic State thinking in Egypt, sine 1950, in Syria since 1970, in Lebanon since 1980’s, in Iran in 1970’s.
The invasion of Iraq is the latest assault on the Muslim world with massive damage to Iraqis and Americans in blood, morality and money.
This US regime is repeating the scenario of Iraq on Iran, but not exactly. There is still some hope for a diplomatic solution with more honest dialogue between the US, Iran and the Arab world. The world is facing a triple dangerous interactive conflict: Iraq, Palestine/Israel and Iran. Are coming into yet another new Middle East war?












Lecture at Unitarian Church in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida

IRAQ, IRAN AND PALESTINE CONNECTIONS
Ghassan Michel Rubeiz, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, June 4, 2006

The US is mixed up in a three interactive conflict areas, namely, Iraq, Iran and Palestine.

First Iraq:

1. 9/11 gave the neo conservative power in US. They conceived in 9/11 an open sesame policy. With a 9/11 pass-par-tous key the Neos entered Afghanistan and then Iraq. Fighting international terrorism was less urgent than solving the Arab Israeli conflict with force.

2. Invasion of Iraq was designed to come closer to the sources of “evil” in the region: Saddam Hussein, Palestinian Hamas, Lebanese Hizbullah, Syrian and Iranian regimes. This approach is dictating the peace process.

3. Results counterproductive: Hamas is ruling; Hizbullah strongest power in Lebanon; Syrian regime received an extension of legitimacy after being on life support conditions; Iran gets a new Kaddafi figure in Ahmadinajad.

4. US reacts by staying the course in Iraq, following an eradication policy of privation in Palestine and creating a Security Council resolution ( 1959) to deal with Syrian regime and with Hizbullah . US lobbies heavily for Sanctions on Iran at UN, with a subtle warning for an air attack should sanctions fail.

5. Hizbullah, Hamas, Ahmedinajad, Syria’s Assad and Iraq’s Sadr form an informal alliance against the two adversaries: US and Israel.

Iraq is a quagmire occupation with no clear vision on what to do and how to leave a broken country that was bad and now is awful; thanks to a war without preparation, a war without reason, a war without a chance for a positive ending and a war against a solution.

Will the Iraqi army be able to quiet the rebellion? Inshallah. We do not know how long it will take? No immediate solution appears. The sooner the US army leaves Iraq, the more likely the solution will appear. The solution may materialize through local communal wisdom, with some help from the region and with participation of international good will. Iran can play a negative or a positive role, depending how confident it feels and how much it is in conflict with the US and Israel.
Iraq’s full unity is hard to bring back. The Kurdish autonomy is irreversible, but not the Shiite/ Sunnite connection. The heart of the problem is the regressive nature of the current constitution. The latter rift between Muslims of Iraq is reversible, given a common language, same religion, frequent intermarriages and a strong Arab identity. A regional conference may help bring the major Arab countries and Iran into the decision making process. But that would require thawing of tense relations between the the US and Iran.

IRAN US RELATIONS


Facing so much difficulty in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US may have to radically shift its Iran and larger Middle East policy. A visionary US foreign policy requires three new elements:

A. Intense high level dialogue with the Iranian regime,
B. Creative program of exchange with Iranian society
C. Fair response to Iranian related Middle East trouble spots.


PALESTINE ISRAEL CONFLICT

1. Unilateral Withdrawal and Wall of exclusion are unhealthy and non lasting measures

2 Palestinians should read the sign on the wall and start using their greatest assets, namely, human rights, empowerment of their people and staying power. Time is on their side.

Progressive Israelis should seek this moment of opportunity to achieve a realistic two-state solution based on 1967 borders.

The recent Abbas- Prison-reformists referendum initiative may have a chance to turn the tide against militant Hamas

The referendum may empower secular and peace oriented Palestinians, but will the US and Israel support a 1967 framework for peace?