Sunday, June 29, 2008

Vote Obama, Be Proud of Nader and Listen to Gibran

Vote Obama, Be Proud of Nader And Listen to Gibra

East Meredith, June 28, 2008

Grubeiz@comcast.net

Many Arab Americans are rethinking their enthusiasm for Barack Obama. Not only do they watch him pander to the strong Israeli lobby, but they observe his campaign handlers distancing themselves from Muslims. Hoping to teach Obama a lesson, some Middle East Americans plan to vote for Ralph Nader, to abstain or vote Republican.

But what would be the consequences of such a temperamental shift? If Arab and Muslim voters go Nader’s way, they would harm the chances of a prospective winner of the US presidency, a winner who shows great promise for this nation and the world. Understandably, they wish to demonstrate their voting power as an American community. But those voting for Nader - the Lebanese American perennial candidate, a genius activist of a bygone era, a “spoiler” in a previous presidential race- would provoke one half of American society, the Democrats; and amuse the other half, the Republicans. Democrats are dreaming and sacrificing to see significant change in American politics come January 2009; Republicans are busy plotting one scheme after another to trap Obama in positions of discomfort, shame or weakness.

The difference between betting and gambling is that the former offers better chances of winning. Voting for Obama is a smart bet; voting for Nader is high risk gambling. A vote for Nader is effectively a vote for McCain. With a Bush-extension regime Arab and other vulnerable communities would suffer disproportionately.

If America loses Obama as the next president, the country will have to endure four more years of neo-con politics. This extra- conservative era would continue to manifest alienating international diplomacy, excessive defense spending, neglectful health care, degraded ecology, petro-dollar politics and cultural xenophobia.

The best thing that Arab Americans can do to cope with Obama's possessive promoters is to remain faithful to the Democratic ticket. However, it is also important to stay critical.

Let us be realistic. If Arabs and Muslims become too closely associated with Obama, they risk hurting his chances of winning, given Israel’s strong influence on his and all Democratic presidential campaigns. Americans with ties to Palestine and Islam are where they should be in this campaign: supportive but distant, interactive but weary of Obama. It is in their interest to help Obama with moderate support and to challenge him to contribute to a better domestic and foreign policy when he is in power.

The Lebanese American prophet, Khalil Gibran, wrote in 1925: “Are you a politician asking what your country can do for you, or a zealous one asking what you can do for your country? If you are the first then you are a parasite; if the second, then you are an oasis in the desert.”

Vote Obama, admire Nader and listen to Gibran.

Peace, Not In My Lifetime

Peace? Not In My Lifetime


East Meredith, New York, June 26, 2008

grubeiz@comcast.net

“Peace in the Holy Land? Not in my lifetime,” is an opinion I hear too often from my Jewish American friends. Arab Americans have a similar pessimistic view of the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

Making peace is a process of commitment. To make a deal one merely needs a client willing to bargain, but to make peace one needs a respectful and responsive partner.

Currently, Arabs and Israeli leaders are trying to make deals on three parallel and separate fronts: Israel’s occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, Tel-Aviv’s severe siege of Gaza, and prisoner exchange between Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Jewish State.

Middle East politicians may be able to score limited gains in these current negotiations but lasting peace they will not achieve through a fragmented approach. To reach a peace breakthrough, Arabs and Jews need to undergo radical changes in attitude.

Imagine an Arab awakening that prepares visionary statesmen for peace. In such an awakening Arabs would recognize Israel’s fear of being a minority state within an Arab collective of 22 countries. Arabs would pledge not to take revenge if power were to shift in their favor. Rulers would seriously engage in political reform. If this fundamental change were to occur, Israel would then perceive the Arabs as responsive partners for peace.

Imagine a parallel Israeli renewal of orientation. In such a renewal Israelis would acknowledge the consequences of their land occupation and displacement of all people involved. Israelis would fully accept a free, viable and independent Palestinian state. They would assume moral and financial responsibility to compensate Palestinians for their multifaceted suffering. When all these revolutionary changes take place, Israelis will then become an attractive partner for peace with Arabs.

Regrettably, neither side is on the path to peace. Facing desperate conditions, leaders in Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza are gambling over fragmented political solutions that do not require reorientation of policy and remobilization of efforts. Weak leadership does not take risk, make sacrifice or solve fundamental national problems. In seeking relief from battle-fatigue and political stress Israel and three Arab countries are now engaged in a process of deal-making. On the surface the deal-making looks like peace-making.

What are these three deals that Arabs and Israelis are trying to hammer out?

First, Syria and Israel are talking covertly about peace possibilities if the Golan Heights is returned to Syria. Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967 and annexed the territory in 1981. Strangely, while Israel conducts these talks with Syria it is threatening military intervention in Iran, Syria’s closest ally. But this may not be the best time to revive the Golan issue. Not only is Syria is under US sanctions, in recent months Israel launched a surgical attack on Syrian facilities that it claimed were nuclear. Today is Israel really ready to return the strategic, Golan border-district to Syria after years of integrating the territory in its society.

The second Arab Israeli deal covers the crippling siege of Gaza which is under Hamas rule. Israel has already signed a six-month truce with Hamas, effective June 19. The deal stipulates that Hamas will stop shelling rockets into border towns in Israel. In return, Israel will gradually lift the siege on Gaza. Hamas agrees to reign-in the shelling from other Palestinian factions and Israel stops its assassination campaign of resistance leaders. The chemistry of this deal has been sour from the start. Ehud Olmert accuses leaders in Gaza of being “blood-thirsty terrorists”. And Hamas reciprocates by refusing to recognize the existence of Israel. Despite the rhetorical denial of the state of Israel, Hamas pleads with Egypt to mediate. It desperately seeks Cairo’s intervention to terminate the Israeli siege on the strip. Both sides are trapped. For Israel, the siege policy has not worked to break the will of Hamas. Consequently, Israel seems to be rethinking its failed policy of brutally forcing political change.

The third parallel and separate deal relates to Lebanon. Israel is negotiating with Hezbollah a prisoner exchange. At the same time, Israel has invited Beirut government to direct bilateral peace talks. But Lebanon today is stressed and fragile; it cannot be a norm breaker. Individual Arab states consider unconditional direct talks with Tel-Aviv a taboo. Israel wishes to make deal with Hezbollah, an organization it has considered a criminal agent. Is Tel-Aviv willing to swap prisoners with Hezbollah after launching a war two years ago that tried to obliterate this resistance movement, a war that is sadly still considered unfinished?

The prognosis of these three separate, parallel and hesitant rounds of peace talks is poor. The difference between peace making and deal making is in attitude and process. In the search for peace the actors are respectful of one another and their efforts are relevant, genuine, timely and coordinated.

To achieve lasting peace Arabs and Israelis must look each other in the eye and start direct, coordinated and comprehensive negotiations. The two sides will reach productive exchange of ideas on their interlinked future when they recognize mutual concerns and imagine relevant and decisive solutions.

“Not in my life time”.

-

Saturday, June 14, 2008

Can Arabs and Jews Unite Behind Barack Obama?


East Meredith, New York,

June 12,2008

Arab and Jewish Americans should continue to support Obama despite his apparent limits in capturing all the complexities of their conflict. He remains sentimentally, culturally, and ideologically fair and balanced in Middle East politics.

His limitations are not only in his knowledge of facts about Israel and Palestine. Attitude matters too. In trying too hard to prove that he is not biased toward the Arab cause, he is bound to occasionally stumble in attempts to reassure the Jewish voter. Last week Obama’s diplomatic lapse at AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) Annual Convention illustrates why an American decisive statesman is expected to stay neutral in Arab-Israeli affairs.

Soon after the Senator clinched the Democratic presidential nomination he hurriedly prepared to speak to the annual meeting of the most influential Jewish lobby. Like the rest of Washington’s guest politicians, the senator from Illinois pledged to the rich and powerful audience his unqualified loyalty to the Jewish state.

But Obama went too far in comforting and easing doubts. To demonstrate his loyalty to Israel, he declared that Jerusalem must “remain undivided” as the capital of the Jewish State. This position is at variance with the current official US policy, a policy which regards Tel-Aviv, not Jerusalem, as the capital. Washington abides by international law on the status of Jerusalem: the future of the City of Peace must be negotiated by both Arabs and Jews.

At AIPAC the presumptive Democratic nominee was perceived to have naively handed Arab East-Jerusalem to Israel. Later, when confronted with Arab criticism, Obama swiftly retreated to a more moderate position. Then the Jewish side was upset by his easy retreat. This incident was a lesson for Obama to resist improvised diplomacy.

But in the larger scheme of things, Obama’s Middle East policy is right on track. If elected president, he may be able to revive the currently stagnated Middle East peace process. He is open to talks with Iran, Syria and their partners; to disciplined withdrawal from Iraq and to decisive talks on a two-state solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

When it comes to the Middle East, it is unfortunate that all US politicians are viewed through a framework of a zero-sum-game: what is good for Israel is bad for the Arabs and vice versa. In fact, Obama’s outlook on the Middle East is refreshingly positive and inclusive. He rightly believes that Israel’s lasting security is in the creation of a viable Palestinian state. Obama seems to believe that what is good for Israel is good for Palestinians and Arabs.

Single issue voters are often discouraged when their candidate deviates from their passionately held positions. Arab Americans who may vote for the next president merely through a Palestinian perspective may have to rethink their ballot.

When an Arab-American voter is upset with Obama for a statement that is unfair to the Arab cause, that voter needs to keep in mind that even Black American reformers wish to see Obama more critical of White America. But these civil rights reformers appreciate the limitations of a campaign with a national scope. Afro-Americans are mindful that if their candidate -Obama- invests too deeply in raising civil-rights issues in his campaign, he will risk becoming too distant from the America political center.

When a Jewish American voter is upset with Obama for declaring readiness to talk with Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran that voter needs to be reminded that Israel is in fact currently talking with its adversaries, covertly or indirectly. Jewish Americans who withhold votes from Obama because of his compassion for Palestinian suffering are not serving the long-term security needs of Israel.

Both Arabs and Jews should realize that a McCain White House would delay peace in the Middle East for a decade or more. Another Republican term would reinforce a war oriented conflict between America and the Muslim world. Extended Bush-based policies starting in 2009 may deliver the nation into near bankruptcy in the foreseeable future.

In this election year both Arab and Jewish Americans would be smart to vote as Americans first. This is not to say that home background issues should be totally overlooked. Obama has the capacity and the desire to bring peace to the Middle East and offer change to America. If they switch their mindset to a win-win paradigm Arabs and Jews may find a mutual friend in Obama.

Tuesday, June 03, 2008

Lebanon Is Back On Track – But for How Long?



East
Meredith, NY
grubeiz@comcast.net

June, 1, 2008

Lebanon has undergone intense changes over the last two weeks. What are those changes and what brought them about? Over the last three years Lebanon lost almost all of the post-civil war recovery that started in 1990.

In these three years Lebanon has witnessed over a dozen political assassinations, a devastating war with Israel, an 18 month open-strike, a prolonged battle between a fundamentalist militia and the national army within a Palestinian refugee camp, periodic inter-militia fighting, a reduced cabinet, a missing president, a non-functioning parliament, repeated airport closures, migration of skilled labor, and a spiraling national debt.

But suddenly in the second week of May, the political climate turned positive, and a five-day meeting in Doha, Qatar, produced a historic agreement between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the pro-West governing coalition. A consensus president, the former chief of armed forces, Michel Suleiman, was elected on May 23. It is still too early to tell if the ongoing preparation for a national unity government, the agreement for a new electoral law (that gives minorities better opportunity for competition in the parliament), and the inauguration of the new president constitute signs of normalization.

The sudden change in the political fortunes of Lebanon is not merely spontaneous recovery. Three factors explain this dramatic burst of rational problem solving: the tilt of power in favor of the opposition, improved relations among Lebanon’s neighbors, and preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections.


Power Shift


Lebanon’s pre-Doha government gradually lost its raison d’etre in the face of unraveling national security. Until recently, the government was able to control the opposition by accusing Hezbollah of undermining the state, by acting as the guardian of international law-against outlawed militia presence, by maintaining a minimum level of law and order, and by securing much needed aid from Washington and the Western world.

But extended political paralysis weakened the government considerably. Its inability to command the national army to confront Hezbollah was a clear indication that a new formula of governance was due. The Lebanese saw implications of this tilt in power and so did their government and the rulers of other Arab countries.

After an eighteen-month struggle between the opposition and the government ruling coalition, the former has finally reached a position of advantage. With the help of the secular Christian movement, known as the Reform and Change party, the opposition tightened pressure on the government using measured tactics of social influence. The tactics included withdrawal from the cabinet, an open strike in the heart of the capital, a mass media campaign, a strengthening of relations with Iran and Syria, and an alliance with left-leaning political parties. But Hezbollah’s most intimidating measure was to build its militia positions in the south and the east of the country and in Beirut.

On the whole, Hezbollah has been peaceful in its domestic resistance. It has projected the image of a political force and a national guard against external danger. However, its recent short bout of fighting with Sunni and Druze armed groups somewhat tainted its image and strengthened the thesis that this movement is essentially a militia-based culture. In those few days of fighting, Hezbollah showed that it could derail the country into chaos; the government took notice of Hezbollah’s military muscle.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah has been able to make its case that Lebanon needs a new defense strategy, that Israel poses a regional military threat, and that the Lebanese armed forces are not capable of defending the country. Lebanese, from all backgrounds and levels of education, argue emotionally about Hezbollah’s future in the country. Hezbollah’s arms remain Lebanon’s greatest dilemma.


Talking to the Enemy


The shift in power in Lebanon is one reason that the Doha Accord has brought a new regime of power-sharing. The second reason is the recent burgeoning of regional talks. Despite the ongoing bitter debate in America about the wisdom of “talking with the enemy,” in the Middle East politicians are currently talking to each other across hostile borders.

Syria talks with Israel through Turkey. The newly elected Lebanese president sets a respectful tone in addressing the concerns of Damascus. Syria takes a friendlier tone with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran and Saudi Arabia exchange visits. The French President plans a trip to Lebanon and Syria. Israel and Hezbollah whisper about the exchange of prisoners.

Washington watches the rapid changes in Lebanon without being able to influence its future course. It has supported the government unconditionally, and it has consistently threatened the opposition. Washington’s position is that the Lebanese opposition can do no good as long as Hezbollah is armed.

Visitors from around the world plan to travel to Lebanon this summer. But last week the State Department issued a security alert advising Americans not to go to Lebanon, due to anticipated insecurities associated with Hezbollah.


An Eye on the Future

The next milestone in Lebanon’s future is a new parliament to be elected in the spring of 2009. The Beirut Center for Research estimates that Hezbollah, the Reform and Change party, and their opposition partners will win the majority of the parliamentary seats in these coming elections.

The Doha Accord situates the opposition today as a significant minority in the cabinet with one third of the seats. But the opposition plans on being the majority in the 2009 parliamentary elections, and if that happens, the opposition will become the ruling majority.

Not to minimize its influence, Doha was a package of political compromises. On one side, Hezbollah with its allies, Syria and Iran, are satisfied to have Michel Suleiman as president, a leader who can tolerate militia culture. On the other side, the majority coalition is satisfied to retain the position of a pro-West prime minister of the coalition’s choice.

Doha has put Lebanon again on the democracy track. It will be up to the Lebanese to decide if the country will be run in the future by ballots or bullets. Finding a creative and diplomatic solution for Hezbollah’s arms has become a priority. Suleiman is entrusted with opening critical negotiations with Hezbollah on the future of militias in a revitalized policy of national defense. The new government will not have the needed time or clout to radically reform the system. The hope for comprehensive reform rests in the process and outcome of the 2009 elections.

Right now, the Lebanese are thinking ballots, and they want the rest of the world to celebrate with them.