Washington's Obsesssion with Lebanon's Hezbollah

East Meredith, New York, June 28, 2007



The politicians of Lebanon are doing their thing again: pushing their country further into a “failed state” position. While the country is falling apart the warlords of this republic argue ceaselessly about when and how to strengthen Hezbolla’s role in Lebanese governance, a measure that would reflect its constituency. There is consensus that Hezbollah is to stay intact as a party retaining its militia. This obsessive Byzantine circular exchange between the two sides reflects poisonous lack of trust. The government wants Hezbollah diminished and Hezbollah wants the government handcuffed. Cues for politicians’ posturing come from outside the country.

The official Lebanese army remains the only hope of future national unity. But this poorly armed army continues to bleed as it struggles with a ruthless Fateh-al-Islam insurrection in a camp that houses angry and neglected Palestinian refugees. The FAI is a mixed group of Sunni anarchists that include Palestinians, Lebanese and other Al-Qaeda inspired Arabs. In the northern city of Tripoli, and elsewhere, security is deteriorating. In the south the international peace forces have just lost six of their soldiers to an FAI related attack.

As Fateh-al Islam’s mayhem spreads from the north of the country to the south, from inside the camp to outside it and from the Lebanese army to the United Nation’s peace force, Riad and Paris, now look pragmatically at the Hezbollah led opposition. Do they see the potential of Hezbollah’s as a protective agency for a rapidly disintegrating state?

Lebanon invited Amro Musa last week, Secretary General of the Arab League, to resolve a seven months old crisis. Not surprisingly, and not for the first time, The General Secretary failed in his mission after four intensive days of shuttle mediation. Ambassador Musa’s position seemed closer to the government side than to the opposition.

Hezbollah and its allies retain a popular base in several regions of the country. The majority of Shiites(roughly 30% of Lebanon’s population), about a third of the Christians and a minority of (Arab national) Sunnites rally behind Hezbollah. Even some of those who dislike Hezbollah respect its leader, Sheik Hasan Nasrallah.

Opponents of Hezbollah in Lebanon are concerned about its religio-political subculture. They ask the obvious question: will Hezbollah turn fundamentalist in the future? There is no verifiable answer to this speculation. In practice, since its inception in 1983, this movement has been national in scope, welfare oriented in policy and respectful of other minorities. After the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Hezbollah did not take revenge against the South Lebanese Army, a former Christian militia that fought along the side of Israel against the Shia south border community. Currently Hezbollah allies itself with Aoun’s party whose constituency is secular and Christian.

Local politics is only one part of the story of Lebanon. To a certain extent Beirut politics is a pantomime; the voices of local leaders are significantly muted by external mechanisms from the East and the West. Ambassador Musa could have gone to Washington, Paris and Riad and then to Damascus and Tehran to negotiate Lebanon’s crisis. The US, France and Saudi Arabia support and finance the current Lebanese cabinet while Syria and Iran support and finance the Hezbollah-led opposition.

Lebanon’s instability invites Israel’s intervention. Israel regularly tramples on Lebanon’s soil and penetrates its skies. A million unexploded Israeli cluster bombs remain on Lebanese territories from the 2006 war. Cluster bombs are a form of continued Israeli “occupation”. The 400 000 Palestinian refugees carry arms in their camps. The Lebanese army is barred from entrance to refugee camps. Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm is not simply an act of defiance.

For many, Hezbollah provides at least four major benefits: social services, a second tier national security, screening for political corruption and a moderating influence on rapid Westernization. Its opponents remain unimpressed; they worry about a Lebanon with a culture of militias as they reflect on their bloody civil war history. They also fear that the Shia community seeks to compensate military strength for its marginal socio economic status.

Despite significant Lebanese support the US and Israel are highly mobilized to defeat Hezbollah. There is unconfirmed evidence, (Seymour Hirsh reporting) that FAI received financial support from Lebanese and US government sources to position this group as a shield against the (Shiite) Hezbollah.

The Administration’s enmity to Hezbollah is not serving the country. Riad and Paris, America’s close partners in Lebanon have observed that Al-Qaeda cells, such as Fateh-al-Isalm, are destabilizing both to Lebanon and to the region. This fundamentalist insurrection has caused France and Saudi Arabia to soften their stand on Hezbollah.

It is counterproductive for the US to orient its foreign policy in Lebanon around isolating and dismantling Hezbollah. The US rationale for targeting Hezbollah is the protection of the sovereignty of Lebanon and the security of Israel. It may be true that in principle, militias interfere with state sovereignty. It is also a regrettable fact that Hezbollah provoked a disastrous war with Israel last summer. But Lebanon is a weak state in a dangerous region; it has always lived with a power sharing (sectarian) handicap. Despite its social modernity, politically “Loubnan” has always been a co-habituation of religious tribes. This precarious republic has always lacked state sovereignty and faced danger on its borders.

Al-Qaeda’s recent penetration in Lebanon through the FAI and similar anarchist groups is lethal. Lebanon needs all its indigenous resources mobilized and coordinated to cope with the external threats that are rapidly becoming internal structures. If treated as an asset Hezbollah may fulfill positive expectations. Washington’s obsession with Hezbollah is not justified if the intention is to protect Lebanon’s sovereignty or Israel’s security. Are there are better ways for Washington to achieve those two goals of merit? Indeed: revive the peace process and change the paradigm of foreign policy.

A City of Many Colors, By Halim Barakat

Reading Al Madina al Mulawana, a City of Many Colors:
An autobiographical work by Halim Barakat


Ghassan Michel Rubeiz
East Meredith, New York
June 20, 2007


When a renowned social scientist is a gifted story teller and a good writer his literary product has to be enticing. This is the case of Halim Barakat, a Syrian who grew up in Lebanon and migrated to the US in his early thirties. Alamadina al Mulawana, (A City of Many Colors) is Halim Barakat’s auto-biographical lengthy work written in Arabic and published last year by Alsaki, in Beirut. Barakat narrates his formative years in Beirut, first as a student and then as a teacher/writer before his emigration to the US in the early 1960’s. In this story, a young Syrian child attends a Lebanese Quakers orphanage in Ras-al-Matn, a mountainous village. With a scholarship, a few years later, he attends a socially privileged school for boys in Beirut, the International College. Later he studies sociology at the American University of Beirut. He advances his carrier by starting graduate work, teaching, on the side, writing political commentary, poetry and short stories. He becomes active in local and regional politics. Busy as he is, this man of letters and politics does not ignore his libido for too long. He falls in love simultaneously with two distinguished women and naturally experiences both internal conflict as well as threatening social pressures. He resolves emotional conflict with grace and reason, not without the help of the two prudent ladies he admired.

Writing after the passage of four decades at a period of scholarly retirement, Barakat relies on his phenomenal memories of interesting people he had met, of anecdotes and of limitless personal encounters in Lebanon. The narrative displays excerpts from his diary but it goes beyond personal notes as the author reports on Beirut history before and after the independence of the country. His account of nation building vividly describes the importance of Syria in neighboring Lebanon. His work also details the tactics of traditional warlords wearing modern cloths and serving colonial interests. Brakat’s political ideology reminds me of Frantz Fanon, the Martinique-born political psychiatrist who wrote The Wretched of the Earth and introduced the seminal concept of neocolonialism.

For Barakat, Beirut’s special status in the region is both sweet and sour. Yes, Beirut was the place of cultural encounter between the East and the West; but for him, this encounter has not been genuine. He observes that Beirut imitates Paris without integration of western values. For Barakat, the Lebanese dresses like a westerner but thinks primordially like a villager or a tribesman, especially in matters of politics. The author argues convincingly that what is called confessional democracy in Lebanon is a euphemism for sectarian politics, a formula for endless political instability. Currents events in Lebanon confirm Barakat’s thesis.

Barakat is an admirer of Antoun Saadeh, the founder of the PPS Party: Hizb-al-Kawmy al Suri. Saadeh established a movement of political and social empowerment. This political leader dreamt of a united secular Arab nation within the geographical boundaries of the Fertile Crescent: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Like Saadeh, Barakat is a humanist with no appetite for traditional religion, and yet the book includes many touching prayers of friends and relatives. Saadeh was executed by the Lebanese authorities in 1949 for allegedly threatening the Syrian and Lebanese regimes. Saadeh’s ideas survived him but his party regressed into the formation of a typical Lebanese militia, an entity better known for rhetoric and fighting than for state building. The author reports that he quit the PPS party in time to preserve his intellectual integrity.

As a literary product Almadinat stands out in style and substance. The story is an account of an Arab village boy who bravely confronted barriers of poverty, social dislocation, regimented orphanage childhood, absence of a father and competitive schooling. This boy leaned to turn crises into opportunities.

The story highlights the role of a loving mother in bringing up her children. She sacrificed herself for the family. The author justifiably portrays his mother as a heroine: a simple but intelligent women, a wise character, a hard worker, a role model and a treasure of unconditional love. Reporting on his evolving relations with his mother, his sister and a family relative, Bahia, the author conveys much respect and praise for women’s roles in the Arab world. He points out that the gender gap in the region has sadly become a fact of life, hardly noticed, legalized and morally rationalized.

In this sweeping work there are scores of anecdotes that are illustrative of social, cultural and political realities of Middle East society. These anecdotes are memories, fantasies, humorous events, short stories, poetry and interesting conversations. Barakat is a master in weaving political analysis with literary material. He alternates personal stories with serious reflection on political matters. He reports history without drowning the reader with facts.

An over demanding reader may question why the author ended his auto biography at the age of 29, when the author left for the US in 1962. The last chapter was about a nostalgic visit four decades later from Washington to Beirut and Kafroun, the Author’s village of early childhood. This last chapter looked anti climactic to me and did not add much to the book.

Since this work was not a typical novel the plot was not to have a plot. There was no climax in the story, no moment of high tension to be resolved dramatically. The story is a series of memories, a stream of association, and a sequence of slides taken from the author’s active literary and political life in the city of Beirut, a city of many colors.

Over the last five decades, about a million people have left Lebanon for the Diaspora, as a result of civil war and dirty politics. Many tell stories about the precious Lebanon they left with deep emotions. For the Lebanese who live abroad, Brakat’s book may serve as a catharsis, as an original model of autobiographical writing, a useful commentary on life away from home or a repertoire of Arab literary anecdotes. For others it may serve as a stimulating thesis for secular and ideological political mobilization, a reminder that sectarian politics is fatal. For most Arab readers the book is a forceful story about a creative intellectual who has determination to challenge personal and institutional authority.

Palm Beach Gardens, June 5, 2007

Lebanese Consensus or Civil war?


The US has contrasting relations with Syria and Lebanon. For the US, Syria is on the devil’s track, but Lebanon is a darling. This is a scenario for much drama. Syria considers itself Lebanon’s elder sister (Arabic: al shakika al kubra) and it views Beirut’s intimacy with America as anti-Syrian. Lebanon may have to pay a heavy toll for being too close to Uncle Sam.

As a small country, Lebanon can not stand firm against strong political opposition-from inside or outside the country. The international community, particularly the US and France, has cajoled the Lebanese government to discipline a defiant and militarized resistance movement, Hezbollah. To demilitarize Hezbollah, the US led the Security Council last summer to agree to a UN Resolution (1701) that ended the war with Israel and called for liquidation of all militias in Lebanon. Hezbollah has refused to disarm arguing that the Lebanese national defense system is too weak, the Israel military remains belligerent, and the Palestinian camps are not passive.

The US took another bold and controversial diplomatic move last week. Washington successfully lobbied for UN Resolution 1757: formation of a tribunal to investigate the murder of former Prime Minister Harriri. The US has put immense pressure on Lebanon to try to expose Syria legally through a UN sponsored court.

These two US-led diplomatic maneuvers have strengthened the already exiting relations among Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. This trio is a formidable formation of rejection and populism in the region. The failure of the US in Iraq has weakened its influence in the rest of the region.

Nevertheless, America continues to assume the role of the chief foreign architect in the Middle East political landscape. When the US can not fix a country it breaks it. Iraq and Palestine are clear examples of messy US intervention. Within Iraq and the Palestinian communities the US has consistently played one rival side against the other.

Similarly, in Lebanon, the US has supported the government and encouraged it to remain distant from the demands of the opposition. The opposition, led by Hezbollah’s political arm, is not ready to participate in the September presidential elections. The opposition has been demanding political reform and better representation in a “national unity” government.

Domestic tension makes the Lebanon of today resemble Lebanon of 1975, a pre-civil war period. If a smooth election of a new president does not take place in September ‘07 the country may split into two rival entities. This split might easily lead into a new civil outbreak.

Will the Lebanese be smart enough to avoid being the victims of cold war dynamics between two political fronts: Iran/Syria on one side and US/Israel on the other?

When the Lebanese pressured Syria to leave their country in 2005, they achieved unity and experienced liberation. At times, Syria has been helpful to its little-sister state; but more often than not the Syrian regime has exploited Lebanon. While the Lebanese should strive to be politically independent from Syria, they can never afford to treat their immediate Arab neighbor as a stranger, much less as an enemy. Syria and Lebanon are too close, demographically, historically and socially, to function without coordination and civility. Given the realities of the region, has not Syria already paid for its sins by withdrawing from Lebanon? This is the question that divides public opinion sharply.

To Syria, the Lebanese international search for justice for the killing of Harriri appears to be a US political ploy to hurt the Damascus regime. Is it political overkill for Lebanon to try to expose Syria globally through “Western” channels of justice?

Lebanon is appealing to a weak international system to deal with Syria’s hegemony.
The United Nations has already lost much credibility for its incompetence to apply the rule of international law in the Palestinian question. A major regional injustice has been neglected by the international community for 40 years: the 1967 Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian land. Now, when Chapter Seven of the Security Council is invoked to enforce retribution for the Harriri case a double standard stands out.

Even if the UN were consistent and effective in enforcing international law the Harriri tribunal will still face the problem of partnering with a divided and a relatively shady government. The Harriri related regime has dominated the country since the end of the civil war in 1990. It is associated with a national debt that has ransomed the economic future of the country. The Lebanese opposition considers the national debt an “economic assassination”.

The physical security of the Lebanese state is another embarrassment to the current government. The Lebanese national army has never managed to protect the national borders against Israeli intervention. Currently, the Lebanese forces are even having much trouble in handling a few hundred rebels in a Palestinian camp; rebels without a cause, rebels that boast of nauseating heroism. A very weak national army provides room and reason for the formation of ethnic paramilitary groups.

Finally, the Lebanese cabinet’s embrace of the Bush administration is too provocative for a large section of Lebanese society. Critics of the US point out that last summer America partnered with Israel in a devastating war that showed little respect for Lebanese life, ecology or infrastructure.

Neither the Lebanese opposition nor the Lebanese government can win, or should win, the dangerous battle of wills that has been raging since November 2006. Both sides should compromise to avoid dragging the country into a new civil war. To survive, Lebanon should neither embrace the West nor walk in the shadow of any Arab country.