Friday, August 25, 2006

Poltical reform should accompany aid in Lebanon

Political reform should accompany rebuilding in Lebanon
Ghassan Rubeiz, August 25, 2006

Humanitarian aid is rushing to Lebanon. But rebuilding a stable Lebanon goes beyond administering humanitarian aid and securing its borders. Political reform to achieve national unity and regional integration should accompany rehabilitation and reconstruction. A divided country without willingness for genuine political restructuring will not properly utilize humanitarian and military support.

The Lebanese emerged from civil war that ended in 1990 without heeding the lessons of the 15-year conflict. The Lebanese reconstructed their country efficiently with new housing, a new downtown, a new airport and a new image, but they failed to fundamentally change the political system that had led them into the civil war.

To be fair, the Lebanese achieved some political progress after their civil war, but they left the divisive power sharing system intact. In addressing political reform to achieve peace, the 1989 Taif Accord enhanced the balance of representation of the various religious sects, called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and stipulated termination of rival local militias.

In matters of parliamentary representation, Christian-Muslim parity was achieved, but the largest community, the Shiites, remained under-represented. Moreover, Shiites could not assume the position of prime minister, chief of armed forces or the presidency of the Republic. Although the Christian community is about one third of the population, it retained the privileged monopoly over the presidency and army command post. Though the Sunnite community is smaller than the Shiite, both communities have the same number of parliamentarians. And, the Sunnites retained the prestigious and powerful post of the prime minister. In Taif, the post of the speaker of the house of parliament remained with the Shiites. Despite the Taif restrictions on the power of the presidency and the upgrading of the Speaker’s position, the Shiite community felt somewhat neglected in the Taif Accord, but this majority community initially remained silent.

The inadequate Taif reforms kept the Lebanese divided. The country’s weak national unity indirectly delayed the withdrawal of the Israelis and the Syrians. The Lebanese factions argued about causes of their two occupations, how to resist local and international hegemony, and whether the Syrian occupation was as bad as the Israeli occupation. When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in the year 2000, they argued whether the Israeli occupied Shib’a farms were worth fighting for. When Syria withdrew in the year 2005, they argued about future relations with this country, and whether this neighbor regime had killed their popular Prime Minister, Rafic Harriri. The Lebanese keep forgetting that Syria is a sister country, no matter how naughty a sister can be.

The last fifteen years of partial recovery of Lebanon have given the three dominant communities a strange and deceptive balance of power that kept the politicians satisfied and the people anxious. To a degree, Sunnites dominated politics; Christians dominated the cultural orientation and Shiites built a military state within a state.
The former (Sunni) Prime Minister Harriri led Lebanon into a rapid and financially risky business recovery that erased the physical marks of the destructive civil war at a high price. A national debt of US 40 billion dollars faces the Lebanese today. In five weeks this summer, the many years of costly post civil war recovery were reversed significantly.

After the civil war, the Christians were hyper-active in bringing back Western consumerism and rapid (and some would say superficial) modernity to a country that was once called Paris of the Middle East. In recent years, East and West Beirut looked European but South Beirut, where the Shiites lived in dense communities, looked like congested Cairo. Not long ago, Michael Hudson, an observer of the Middle East, described Lebanon as two culturally and politically distinct societies. Pointing to the growing cultural and political split in identity among the Lebanese, Hudson spoke of “two Lebanon’s”.
Representing the Shiites, Hizbullah indulged in military build up to resist the Israeli occupation and to create its own world of political reform. Critics of Hizbullah accuse it of facilitating an invisible Iranian occupation while disrespecting the Lebanese state.

The current ceasefire in south Lebanon is fragile. The current mood of national unity against Israel’s harsh attack on Lebanon may not last long. Societal unity against a common enemy will not endure. However, the unity of the country can be cemented only when all the religious communities are treated equally under the law.

Political reform should occur on several fronts. Enhancing and harmonizing relations of Lebanon with Syria, Iran and the US are top political reform priorities. As long as the US, Syria and Iran are close to some Lebanese factions and distant from others, the Lebanese unity is at risk. Iran, for example is perceived as an ally of the Shiites while the US is seen as an ally of most Christians and some Sunnites.

Dealing with the political future of Hizbullah is urgent. If the Shiite community gains political power domestically, and with an improved political atmosphere in the region, a solution to Hizbullah’s arms will ultimately materialize. But rushing to solve Hizbullah’s armed presence ahead of domestic reconciliation is counterproductive.

The power sharing formula that assigns parliamentary seats unfairly and restricts access to certain leading political posts is archaic and immoral. In about a year, the Lebanese Parliament will be electing a new president. Can the parliament start soon to prepare new legislation that would rotate the presidency and other leading posts among the various communities? Post Tito Yugoslavia and the current Swiss system provide examples of presidential rotation.

Another measure of reform would be to increase the number of electoral districts to allow minority politicians to run independent campaigns. Currently, political tycoons run and finance long slates of co-opted candidates. Christian candidates tend to run on Muslim led lists to win.
Allowing Lebanese Diaspora citizens who hold Lebanese passports to vote would advance the cause of unity; the Lebanese abroad feel isolated politically. More of Christians left during the civil war than Muslims. Diaspora voting would heal the psychological wounds of all emigrants and empower Lebanon, economically and politically, domestically and abroad.

Fifteen years of civil war were followed by fifteen years of reconstruction in Lebanon. Now, at the start of a second round of rebuilding, it is important to realize that no matter how generous humanitarian aid is, and no matter how large and empowered the UN-assigned forces may be, Lebanon will not benefit from the external aid without internal political reform.

The author is an Arab-American commentator. His new blog is “Aldikkani.blogspot.com”.

Saturday, August 19, 2006

No winners in this Middle East war

No winners in this Middle East war
By Ghassan Rubeiz --- The Arab American News ---- August 12, 2006

The Middle East is grimmer than ever. U.N. ceasefire fire Resolution 1701 has not addressed the basic issues, namely, relations between the U.S. and Israel on one side, and Syria and Iran on the other. The Hizbullah-Israel five-week battle has no clear winners; there are only losers.

A look at Israel’s war results is sobering. Israel has turned back the clock for Lebanon thirty years. It has destroyed much of Lebanon and emboldened Hizbullah. But Israel has also set back the clock to 1948, when the state was established and its existence was in question.
Partial military success for a state like Israel is failure. Arabs had indulged in scoring war failures in the past, but sadly, they can “afford” it. But Israel can not afford to lose a single major war. Israeli ideologues wonder if they can continue to secure their state with sheer military asymmetry. In the wake of this 33 day battle, some visionary Israelis ask if there is lasting security in total reliance on partnership with the West and severe alienation within the region.

The implications of two limited successive military Israeli failures in Lebanon, (the first was a sudden retreat in the year 2000 from south Lebanon) generates much worry for Israeli leaders and ideologues. For generals, there is alarm that future Arab guerilla-orchestrated wars might not only threaten the security of Israel, but undermine its very existence.

Israelis are aware that Palestinians, Iraqis and other Arabs are watching and learning from the Lebanese border crisis. Angry Arab young men are starting to believe that Israel is not invincible. The implications of this Arab attitudinal shift on the stability of the region are enormous.

As a close partner of Israel, the U.S. pauses to assess the mess of this war. The five-week battle has cost the U.S. what was left of its credibility in the Middle East. The U.S. is seen by Arabs as the major conductor and enabler of this war. The U.S. democracy campaign is an investment in error and hypocrisy. The U.S. condemns Iran and Syria for arming Hizbullah but ignores its mirror-like complicity in arming Israel. The war in Iraq is already a quagmire for the U.S. Iran will exploit the political currency it has gained in recent weeks to spoil U.S. regional politics. Iran is in a position to further harden politics in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Afghanistan and the Gulf states.

So far, the Lebanese people are the major victims of this war. Their state is weaker than ever. They have to rebuild again after 15 years of post civil war rebuilding. Before this summer’s conflict, their national debt was 170% of the gross national product: about 40 billion U.S. dollars.
Lebanon’s current political conditions resemble early civil war realities. In the late seventies the Lebanese militias were stronger than the Lebanese army. Israel and individual Arab states supported different militias. Syria occupied Lebanon in 1976 to protect it and with time the protection turned into domination. On the surface, the Lebanese look united today in facing Israel’s merciless attack, but they remain saddled with divisive sectarian politics. The war may soon bring to the front the Shi'a claim for leadership in Lebanese politics.

Hizbullah faces a big burden. While it has enhanced its standing as a challenger of Israel, it has indirectly weakened the authority of the Lebanese state. With one million displaced, one thousand buried, several thousands in hospitals, Hizbullah must be aware of its burden in giving Israel the pretext to launch a preplanned ruthless war. Hizbullah’s leaders are very mindful that the majority of the Lebanese victims are Shi'a, the community Hizbullah strongly represents.

The entire region is a loser in this crisis. Today, the Arab regimes are shaking as they observe Hizbullah’s performance on the battle field. Having lost several wars with Israel, Arab states are embarrassed to explain their past military failures to their people. Sadly, the defense forces of twenty two Arab nations have been largely used to repress domestic opposition. For being too friendly with the U.S. and Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are the most negatively affected.

Should the cease-fire break, Syria would find itself on the hot front line with Israel and the U.S. Syria has cornered itself in a close alliance with Iran, because it lacks friends in the international community and it wants the Golan Heights back from Israel.

How about Iran? As an enabler of Hizbullah’s heroism, Iran feels vindicated in its proxy war with Israel and in its challenge to U.S. hegemony. But Iran’s support of Hizbullah has weakened its defense of its nuclear program. U.N. Security Council sanctions may be applied on Iran at the end of this month. Iran has opened itself to increased international pressure and to possible future U.S. air assaults on its nuclear facilities.

Iranian society may not wish to finance a costly humanitarian recovery in Lebanon. Iran’s symbiosis with Hizbullah may not be maintained for ever, without involving it in a serious military confrontation. Do the Iranians want a new direct battle front after their unfinished recovery from a long and devastating war with Iraq?

In conclusion, the two major forces in this crisis are the United States and Iran. Of the two, the U.S. bears the greatest responsibility for changing the course of foreign policy and the style of its confrontational diplomacy. Such a U.S. change should encourage Iran to offer breakthrough compromises on Hizbullah, Iraq, Palestine, Syria and on its own nuclear ambitions. The ceasefire in Lebanon will hold for a while, but this regional war is not very likely to terminate by a narrow and ambiguous U.N. resolution. The war causes are not yet addressed. Winners on all sides will only emerge with a regional peace between Israel and the Arab States and within a new era of intercultural understanding.

Source: Ghassan Rubeiz is an Arab American commentator.

Thursday, August 17, 2006

Comment on terrorism to a reader

Carl

Good to hear from you and hope you are enjoying your summer. I hear you saying "US helping Israel, a democracy, is not like Iran and Syria helping Hezbollah, a terrorist organization".

Here is my response:

The definition of "terror" is subjective. It is not helpful to confuse Al Qaeda with national groups of resistance, such as Hezhbollah or Hamas. The occupation of Israel of Arab land and the displacement of millions of people have precipitated grass-roots resistance, albeit outside rules of traditional combat.

Since Arab armies have been silent for decades, the people are rising to launch unauthorized resistance. If you wish, you can consider this the start of a slow-motion Arab revolution that threatens existing Arab regimes and Israeli occupation.

For the US, to arm Israel to the teeth to maintain its illegal occupations in the West Bank, Gaza, Golan Heights, Shiba Farm and East Jerusalem would make the US complicit in injustice and an external player like Iran and Syria. The comparison I made betweeen Iran's help to Hezbollah and US Help to Israel is subjective and not perfect. I also regret Hezbollah's resistance, the same way I regret Israel's occupation.

I appreciate Israel as a state with unlimited resources to help in rebuilding the Middle East. But so far Israel, regrettably, has followed a policy of solving political problems by force. It has relied too much on external support with no long term planning to build bridges with its neighbors.

If I were an Israeli, I would worry about the future of my people in a neighborhood of immense hostility. Many Israeli critics support my views. The way to reverse this situation Israel has to work hard and fast to withdraw from 1967 occupied land. History provides an opportunity for Israel in the near future for making peace. This opportunity will not last for ever.

I am also as critical of Lebanon as I am of Israel. Both countries add much to the diversity of the region.

The current US Administration has made a big mistake to ignore the Palestinian and syrian questions. It has also imprisoned itself in a moral framework of "Freedom vs. Terror". Politics is not only about freedom; it is equally about justice.

Cheers

Ghassan

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Israel's demand for cease fire won't work

Israel's demands for ceasefire won't work

By Ghassan Rubeiz -- The Arab American News ---


For accepting a ceasefire agreement, Israel demands cooperation with the Lebanese army to liquidate Hizbullah. Israel's demand is impossible to satisfy. In integrating an indigenous and popular militia, the Lebanese army is unable to work side-by-side with an enemy state in a condition of intense hostility. Israel is dictating to Lebanon how best to protect its borders. The Lebanese army is ready to assume its responsibility on the border, with a deployment of 15,000 soldiers and with the help of a beefed-up UNIFIL force. Politicians are busy trying to find a compromise to produce a workable U.N. Resolution that would satisfy all sides.
Meanwhile, with a threat to conduct a massive invasion, Israel is pre-empting a U.N. draft resolution that may require its withdrawal behind Lebanese borders. The Jewish state is widening a ground offensive in the South. It is trying to create political facts by gaining territory for political negotiation, and to set up a framework for problem solving on its own terms. In addition, Israel shows that its grand military operation that started on July 12 might have been planned much earlier.
Was Hizbullah's July 12 border attack a grave miscalculation? Has Hizbullah handed Israel a pretext to execute an extensive military scheme in order to enforce U.N. Resolution 1559? Resolution 1559 calls for Lebanese militias to disband. The second prognostic question is whether Israel is committing a great miscalculation of its own, by seeing current geopolitical realities through an outdated 1967 political lens?
If Israel reaches the Litani River in its anticipated invasion, it would not be easy for it to withdraw, even if it had intended to make its presence short. It is likely to meet stiff resistance and face an extended war of attrition. An extended occupation would be very costly for Israel, for Lebanon and for the region.
Israel can not expect history to perfectly repeat itself; the region has changed. In 1967, President Nasser overestimated his ability to withstand hegemonic forces in the region. His defiant rhetoric and poor coordination with neighboring Arab countries that had sentiments to fight Israel, handed the Jewish state a monumental prize. In June 1967, an Arab Israeli war gave Israel a phenomenal territorial victory over combined Arab forces, albeit with indirect support of the U.S. Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in Palestine, the Golan in Syria and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula. Of the 1967 war spoils, Israel has managed to retain Palestinian Occupied Territories and the Syrian Golan, and it has succeeded in neutralizing Egypt by returning the Sinai.
Israel maintained its vast occupation of Arab land over the last forty years by its ability to sustain a policy of deterrence through military power superiority (deterrent asymmetry). There are explanations to Israel's political miracle of "doing injustice and looking just."
The pathetic international diplomacy of Arabs and their uniform autocracy, go a long way to explain Israel's success in looking good, peaceful and democratic to the rest of the industrialized world.
But there are other factors behind the Israeli miracle of keeping the skeletons of its occupation hidden. The suffering of the 1967 occupation (of refugees and displaced people) was not publicized worldwide on TV screens. Grassroots resistance was tame. Iran was silenced by the Shah's pro West regime. The U.S. was still regarded as a neutral power broker. There was no serious international terrorism. Arab cold war (client-state) politics was divisive. And most importantly, political Islam had not developed.
Today, the Arab world is boiling; political Islam is on the rise, and Iran is a regional superpower. The U.S. is saddled with Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, Somalia and North Korea.
In this environment of changed political conditions, Israel's attempt at reoccupying South Lebanon is widening its load of political trouble. In re-settling Lebanon, Israel is strengthening Hizbullah, even if it temporarily weakens the militia's military arm. By going to the Litani River borders to "facilitate" the hypothetical deployment of the Lebanese army and the multi national force, the opposite is likely to happen. Hizbullah's "mission" of resistance would be strengthened and its image as a national force of border protection would be totally legitimized.
Israel's invasion and occupation of Lebanon is not only causing a humanitarian tragedy; it is setting the clock back thirty years and fanning the flames of civil tension. In the past, forced international solutions divided the Lebanese into communities of compliance and of rejection. Lebanon does not want a new civil war. Think of the U.S. invasion of Iraq to see the parallel.
As stated earlier, Israel's alternative proposal to the U.N. resolution requires cooperation of its forces with the Lebanese army. The 15000 Lebanese soldiers that would deploy in Israel's shadow in South Lebanon cannot function as a national united force. This would naturally humiliate the Shi'a community, the largest backer of Hizbullah and the largest Lebanese community. The Lebanese state might collapse and the entire country would become an open military frontier, if Israel's occupation turns into a framework for peace making.
Israel's orchestration of peace on the border would mobilize Syria. An Israeli-occupied Lebanon would easily bring Syria directly to the conflict. Would Israel then attack Damascus and other Syrian cities such as Homs or Hama? How would a Syrian-Israeli war affect the new regime in Syria?
Syria and Iran have a defense treaty. Iran comes next on the "axis of resistance." Thus the war of "security" that Israel is generating by reoccupying Lebanon widens. Iran would become involved as Israel directs peace efforts in South Lebanon. If Iran is attacked for aiding Hizbullah and Syria, a new level of international tension would be reached. With Iranian influence on Iraq's stability, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and other Gulf Shi'a communities, are the U.S. and Israel able to calculate the cost of increased regional instability?
The circle of instability widens further in the region as a result of a possible Israeli reoccupation of Lebanon. In Egypt and Jordan, there is growing popular anger against the regimes for forging a fragile peace with the State of Israel and for being too dependent on U.S. policies. Saudi Arabia, being the closest U.S. ally, must be alarmed about a possible popular revolt. It is not known if a new Israeli occupation of Arab land would stimulate grassroots Arab anger to a regime-tipping point. The "New Middle East" that President Bush is planning for the region may turn out to be not Washington-oriented. It may be a domestic regime-change, where the force is from the street, not from abroad; where the culture of change is indigenous, not foreign; and where the end game is unpredictable and highly risky.
Lastly, occupation-induced anger provides new recruits for radical resistance movements, of which Hamas and Hizbullah are prototypes. This popular anger also fuels mobilization of international terrorism and allows Al- Qaeda types of terror groups to mix with or influence legitimate national resistance.
Hizbullah can not be eradicated by force. What was true in 1967, 1977, 1987 and 1997 is not true today. Much has happened in a decade. The U.S. and Israel must review their concept of security, reconfigure their war strategies, revive dormant peace plans, re-assess the dynamics of globalization, review the value of soft diplomacy and reconsider the role of economic empowerment and cultural sensitivity in democracy building. g
The author is an Arab American commentator.
August 12, 2006

Monday, August 07, 2006

US Policy Not Helping Lebanon

US Policy Not Helping Lebanon

Ghassan Rubeiz, July 24, 2006

In trying to solve the problem posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the US destroyed the infrastructure of that country, and, as a result, found itself in a quagmire. Similarly, in trying to disarm Hezbollah, Israel is destroying Lebanon and risking self entrapment. Israel’s plan to pressure the Lebanese to “deliver” Hezbollah has also apparently backfired.
On July 12, the Middle East crisis was about Hezbollah’s provocative border incursion. But in the two weeks since, the disproportionate Israeli reaction has shifted the crisis from a border issue to a regional conflict.

The US Secretary of State was in Beirut on July 23, starting a series of shuttle diplomacy trips to try and stop hostilities, albeit in risky slow motion. Condoleezza Rice’s top priority is Israel’s border security. She also wants to re-empower the Lebanese government. But while Ms. Rice takes precious time to reach her political goals, a bad humanitarian situation is reaching the level of a massacre. Rapidly worsening conditions are not giving the US diplomats any pause to rethink their approach. On her recent trip, Rice promised a “new Middle East”. What does she mean by this optimistic but ambiguous phrase? Regional observers have come up with many wild scenarios to interpret the unfolding U.S. policy.

Despite earlier indications from the heads of some influential Arab countries that Hezbollah should be “disciplined,” the predominant sentiments of Arabs in the street, and their leaders, now include rage over Israel’s fierce retaliation, anger over US support of the Jewish state, and a growing admiration for Hezbollah’s defiance of Zionism.
The US insists that Hezbollah’s military wing should vanish, the captured Israeli soldiers be returned, and the Lebanese government assume defense of its borders. The US insists that all three goals guaranteed before a cease fire goes into effect. Regrettably, the US is unable to see or acknowledge the realities that undermine the goals it seeks.

First, Hezbollah has proven to be more resilient than expected and the Lebanese state looks weaker today than ever. When there is an equilibrium of power between adversaries, and the cost of continuing fighting is high to all parties, a cease-fire should precede, not follow, a political settlement. A cease-fire is supposed to create the space in which political negotiations can take place.

The second new reality that the US must appreciate is that Hezbollah’s militancy after the civil war is an artifact of Lebanese politics. The Shiites there compensated for a lack of power, privilege and status by maintaining a militia. Militias thrive in environments of perceived social injustice. Placing Lebanese soldiers on the border with Israel will not work without a voluntary and sensitive integration of Hezbollah into a reformed, viable Lebanese political arrangement. The idea of a multinational force to take responsibility for the nation’s borders seems to be gaining currency. But a deprived, humiliated and angry Shiite community, which represents 40% of Lebanon, will again destabilize the country and sabotage the multinational force. In any case, such an external force could only perform well if Iran and Syria choose to cooperate.

The third reality is that in the current crisis is of multiple competing national interests and causes Syria, a staunch supporter of Hezbollah, wishes to regain its occupied Golan Heights from Israel. Hezbollah serves Syria’s interest and, in return, gets its support. Palestinians, who have bonded with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, are struggling to “liberate” the occupied territories. Hamas, in particular, is pressing to be recognized as a legitimate government. Iran, an ideological partner and financier of Hezbollah, wants normal relations with the US, leverage in developing its nuclear capabilities, and recognition of its new status as a regional power. Israel and the US are closely tied into a symbiotic and blinding alliance that often slows their learning of how best to reach their own long term strategic interests.

All of these competing problems and claims cannot be solved at once. But it is imperative for the US to focus on urgent Israeli-Lebanese issues first. Then, the US should be seen to take the Syrian, Palestinian and Iranian claims more seriously.
A cease fire must be declared soon. It should be based on four urgent measures: deployment of an international force (with a peace enforcement mandate), deployment of the Lebanese army on the border with Israel; the exchange of the three captured Israeli soldiers for Arab prisoners (including the recently captured Hamas politicians in Israel); and an Israeli promise to return Shib’a Farms to Lebanon.

Next, the cease fire agreement should stipulate an immediate reactivation of the regional peace process that would engage the US and Israel with all parties. Such a comprehensive conference would deal with Shib’a Farm (per a 1949 agreement between Lebanon and Israel ); Hezbollah’s demilitarization and political future; (UN Resolution 1559); full Palestinian statehood; the return of Syria’s Golan Heights; and Israel’s lasting peace with the Arab world (UN Resolution 242 and 338). Additionally, the conference would discuss normalization of relations between Iran and the US.

US tolerance for negotiation with adversaries, both states and militia representatives, is a requirement for peace making. Israel has negotiated with Hezbollah before, the British negotiated with the Irish Republican Army and leaders of the former South African Government negotiated with the African National Congress. If adversaries are cavalierly ignored, conflicts will drag on. In the present case, the US risks losing all forms of cooperation with the Arab and Muslim world in the next ten to twenty years.
Solving Lebanon’s problem is dealing with its divisive sectarian power-sharing and responding to regional issues that directly influence Lebanese politics. There is a popular theory in the Arab world that Israel and US policy targets ethnic and sectarian fragmentation of Arab countries. While this may sound paranoid, developments in Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon are not likely to diminish Arab anger and suspicions. Even if Israel does not intend to destroy Lebanon, a continuation of the current irresponsible fighting could cripple Lebanon and make it a failed state for generations to come.

East Meredith, NY

Friday, August 04, 2006

This madness must stop

Arab american News , Week of August 4, 2006

Ghassan Rubeiz
Palm Beach Gardens,
Florida

The expanding Hezbollah- Israel war is a new chapter in a long regional conflict. Arabs and Jews are living out a cycle of violence that is fueled by extreme suspicion, hatred and fear, a selective perception of history, a self-centered interpretation of God’s Providence, a twisted resort to religious authority and mutual demonizing.

Over the last six decades Arabs and Jews have fought five major battles….in 1948, 1967,!973, 1982 and 1987 . Since the year 2000, Israelis and Palestinians have been engaged in low intensity warfare in occupied Gaza and the West Bank.

Regrettably, Lebanon has too often been the arena of confrontation in the ongoing conflict between Arabs and Jews. In the current war, Hezbollah’s reckless attitude has exposed Lebanon to Israel’s ruthless defense instinct. Hezbollah’s limited raid precipitated Israel’s brutal and disproportionate response. In fact, Israel’s military radicalism is accommodating and fueling Hezbollah’s extremism.
The battle between Israel and Hezbollah is intensifying in face to face combat and threatens to involve Syria directly in the fighting. Israel hopes to achieve a final knock-out victory. If Israel occupies south Lebanon to “finish” Hezbollah militarily, south Lebanon might become a Gaza-like occupation with consequences not much different from Baghdad’s quagmire. If disarmed by brutal force, Hezbollah is likely to rearm in the near future. In this war, Hezbollah has won the hearts and minds of the Arab . It has won the “image” and “honor” victory. This “psychological” victory is due to the asymmetry of power...David taking on Goliath. The “victory” is also a result of the Arab need to deal with the shame of losing out to Israel in the last five major wars. For most Lebanese and for the Arab street, the sadism of the Israeli response to July 12 has almost morally cleansed Hezbollah’s border misdeed. On the other hand, for most Israelis, “July 12” was treated as a domestic “9/11”.

The expanding Israeli ground offensive in Lebanon risks sparking a regional war that may last for years, with no telling what consequences, except for more agony and dwindling chances for peace.

A regional war might gradually unite Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Iran against Israel and the US. This is an ominous and deadly scenario. Other Arab regimes might fall in the process of growing regional rage. Can one imagine what it would take to quiet a region-wide guerilla insurgency against the US and Israel, an insurgency mobilized on occupied Islamic territory? Lebanon’s Nasrallah would link up with Iraq’s Muqtada Sadr and Gaza’s Mesh’al. Damascus and Tehran would support the three militias. What if Afghanistan opposition fighters were to join their fellow Jihadists?
As Israel’s image of perfect invincibility erodes, and as the image of the US worsens in the Islamic world, the two countries, in covert alliance, are doubling their bets by escalating the war. Like compulsive gamblers, the more they lose, the higher their risk taking in the next move. However, in this gambling game there are no winners; everyone loses.

On July 31, observing a rapidly escalating cycle of mutual destruction between Arabs and Jews in south Lebanon and north Israel, a key Republican openly broke with Washington’s tradition of uniform congressional compliance regarding the Middle East. Angry with Bush’s Middle East policies, Nebraska Sen. Chuck Hagel cried out loud: “The sickening slaughter on both sides must end and it must end now. This madness must stop”.
Senator Hagel challenged US Israeli policy with the exceptional vision of a seer and the courage of a prophet. Normally, the first law of Middle East politics in Washington is that “Israel is right, no matter what”. Any Congress member who challenges Israel or criticizes the US symbiotic alliance with Israel must be either politically suicidal, a retired politician or an extremely brave and active legislator. Hagel, a 2008 Presidential candidate, falls in the category of the brave and credible.

The Republican Senator, who is a close and honest friend of Israel, saw that it is in the interest the Jewish State’s future security to be mindful of restraint and diplomacy in dealing with Hezbollah. This second ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged President Bush to start open talks with Hezbollah supporters, Iran and Syria, to explore political solutions.

This visionary politician conceives of long term security for Israel, not of short term military victories. He knows that at the end of the day, Israel must forge peace with its neighbors in order to survive and thrive. He foresees the inability of the US to protect Israel for ever, as Arabs wake up ideologically and learn to cooperate regionally.

The Nebraska Senator correctly observes that Hezbollah and Hamas are showing that Israel may not be invincible, that faith-based political mobilization is powerful and that Arab regimes, especially those close to the US, are shaky and rapidly losing credibility to grass-roots resistance movements. Worried about the rapidly worsening US image in the region, he cautions Bush with a rhetorical question: “How do we realistically believe that a continuation of the systematic destruction of an American friend – the country and people of Lebanon - is going to enhance America’s image and give us the trust and credibility to lead a lasting and sustained peace effort in the Middle East?”

Chuck Hagel wonders if Israel will be safer in its third occupation of Lebanon. Does the US feel safer for having given Israel the approval to deal with Hezbollah through a “final solution”? Seeing the danger of the US alienating the Muslim world, he said “our special relationship with Israel… cannot be at the expense of our Arab and Muslim relationships”.
By achieving a military victory over Hezbollah, Israel and its backer the US, are merely postponing peace and increasing the risk of fueling a wider conflict. An immediate cease fire followed by an international conference on peace between Arabs and Jews has become imperative, says former Senator George Mitchel. A cease fire in Lebanon is urgent, but it is not sufficient for achieving a lasting regional peace. May this new chapter in regional conflict be short and conclusive.

Author is an Arab American commentator.