Iran key to Syria's conflict

Iran Could Play a Critical Role in Syrian Regime Change

West Palm Beach

Jan 26, 2014.

The Geneva II conference on Syria’s war, started January 22 in Montreux, Switzerland, and resumed on Friday 24, in Geneva.

The tyrannical Assad regime and a cluster of Islamic militant groups are competing at destroying Syria to “save” it and to “liberate” it respectively. The regime is supported by Iran and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah. The divided opposition, including a variety of terror groups, is financed by Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states and myriad international sources.

Unless Saudi Arabia and Iran start cooperating in dealing with Syria Geneva II is doomed. To replace President Assad in Damascus, Tehran could be assigned to engage in delicate political surgery. In a misguided step by the United Nations, Iran was “timed- out” from the decision making process.

While rebel leaders and their supporters were cajoled by the international community to attend the conference, President Assad was expected to end his rule and swallow his pride; and his ally, Iran, was excluded from the decision making process of the conference, a day before it started.

This conference aims to replace Assad in order to install a transitional government, as if dictators in power are good at compliance. Anyway, events have moved on over three years of a civil war. The solution for Syria’s chaos now is beyond the establishment of a national transition group. The challenge is to restore safety, free prisoners, enhance humanitarian aid and rebuild the unity of the state.

It may not be wise at this stage to treat the issue of Assad’s fate as the central deadlock in the conflict. The more attention the timing of Assad’s leaving receives the more difficult it will be to depose him and call for his departure.

While Secretary of State John Kerry is right in viewing President Assad as the primary source of trouble, Syria’s foreign minister Walid Mouallem is also justified in asserting that the Syrian people must decide for their future. It is not well known that nearly half of Syria’s society is still attached to the status quo, not because many like Assad, but because they fear the consequences of a sectarian war: massive revenge and permanent partitioning of the state.

Kerry has ignored the damaging role of the rebels in exporting the conflict beyond Syria’s borders; and Washington has embraced their patrons: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And the Syrian regime has been not been honest in labeling the entire opposition as “terrorists”.

There is no easy way to depose Assad, given the strength of his military and the moderate support he still retains in mainstream society. In planning for Syria, attention is due to Assad’s popularity among minorities and business groups, who choose stability over freedom. Wide divisions in the opposition and severe deterioration in the quality of the struggle demand balanced diplomacy in easing this tyrant out. 

The end of Assad’s political term in office, due in a few months, may be the most feasible time for his exit from power. But his exit is not assured as he threatens to run for another term.

Assad has to go but his army must not go with him, or be dismembered.  Kerry has overlooked the importance of securing the cooperation of Iran in the challenging removal of Assad without dismantling his army.

Iran could make a behind-the-scene deal with Saudi Arabia and the US to ease out Assad. However Iran needs incentives to act. Three prospective rewards come to mind.

Neither Assad nor his Alawite community is religiously, ethnically or emotionally close to the Tehran regime. Tehran’s support for Damascus is a political alliance of convenience between Iran and Syria.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani would lean on Assad to end his term in order to secure a safe exit for his ally, win assurances for his (Alawite) community and other communities who have stood by him.

President Rouhani will gain international recognition and achieve desperately needed economic relief if he were to play a constructive role in Syria, a role which might enhance dialogue on the nuclear issues with the six world powers. Today, Syria for Iran is like Cuba was for the former Soviet Union, a costly resource drain.

In this soft diplomacy Rouhani would need a hand from Saudi Arabia. The Arabian Kingdom must realize that sectarianism is self destructive; it could eventually eliminate any throne.

Russia and the US must make a deal to jointly urge Iran and Saudi Arabia to contain sectarian politics and find common in serving the region.  It would be a breakthrough for Syria and the entire region.

Geneva II is a western model of conflict resolution addressing an Eastern crisis.