Is a Jewish state label a deal breaker?

Published in Palm Beach Post on March 24, 2014

West Palm Beach

March 17, 2014

The promotion of a Jewish state promotes the creation of a parallel Islamic Palestinian state. A region obsessed with political Islam on one side and by political Judaism on the other has no future.

Israel insists on inserting a provocative pre-condition in the ongoing peace talks: Palestinian recognition of Israel as the “Jewish state.”  Over the past eight months US Secretary of State John Kerry has worked hard to bring Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. So far no progress is in evidence.

Israel is no longer immune to domestic reactionary thinking; Zionist ideology has shifted to the right. There are many reasons for this shift. Two factors stand out. Russian-born immigrants and the Orthodox community play a larger role in current Israeli politics. The size and influence of these two communities have grown. The second factor is the widening instability in Arab society; Israel is stronger militarily, and therefore feels entitled to new demands at the negotiating table.

Discouraged by lack of movement in the peace talks, Kerry has drafted a framework of suggestions for a future phase of negotiations. Here are some of Kerry’s expected ideas that have come to light.

In a two-state solution Palestine and Israel would compromise on decisive issues. The Palestinian refugees would receive financial compensation and could return only to the West Bank and Gaza, foreseen as the new Palestinian state. Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders but retain about 80 % of the existing settlements. Land swaps between the two states would preserve the proportion of Palestinian land ownership to 22% of Historic Palestine (or Eretz Israel). Part of East Jerusalem would be shared. Elaborate military measures would ensure Israel’s security on Jordan’s border and in the wider region. Palestine would be demilitarized.  And one more expected concession: the Palestinian Authority would be asked to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.  This new Israeli demand was not part of Oslo or Camp David accords.

Kerry’s framework will be announced soon. The framework addresses the enormous humanitarian and political problems of the occupation and security issues.  In adding the provocative demand for Arab recognition of Israel as the Jewish state Kerry has unintentionally overloaded the agenda of peace making.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is aware that Arab leaders, facing a rising tide of Islamic revolts, are not in a position to recognize the Zionist state as a Jewish state. Is the Prime Minister making an unreasonable request to delay discussions on ending the occupation?

The Jewish state identity is provocative even within the Jewish world. Not all of Israel’s leaders champion the idea of the Jewish state and its inherent implications on minority rights. Many in Israel and its Diaspora do not wish to see a “secular and democratic” state transform to a faith-based entity.  Israel has a fragile demographic makeup - a secular majority and a conservative religious minority that holds disproportionate political power.

Israel is not totally Jewish. Every fourth Israeli is non-Jewish. Twenty percent of the population of Israel is of Palestinian origin.  These Palestinian are natives of former Palestine.  These Palestinians, who currently receive less than a full share of their rights and privileges, are citizens of Israel. They are labeled “Israeli Arabs.” Israeli Arabs will feel even more alien and disadvantaged if they live in a country designated Jewish.

Israel’s leadership argues that the Jewish state will retain its democratic nature and continue to respect the rights of its minorities. This sounds sensible, but for the five million Arabs who now live in Israeli controlled areas, and for the 300 million Arabs who live in the regional neighborhood, a Jewish state appears sectarian and provocative.

A peace process leading nowhere is counterproductive. If Israel is unwilling to forge peace with the Arab world today it should declare the peace process dead. To continue to expand settlements, tighten civil rights on its Arab minorities and to ask the Palestinian Authority to bless a Jewish state does not serve any side of this conflict.

The region drifts to a one-state scenario, not a one-state solution. To assume that Kerry’s framework is capable of radically changing the prospects of peace is to ignore the disheartening outcome of similar initiatives of the past.

 

Lebanon, Hezbollah futute are in Syria's balance

Published in Palm Beach Post on Monday March 3, 2014

Lebanon’s fate lies in Syria’s future

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

It took ten months for Lebanon to form a new government.  This lengthy delay is symptomatic of rising national tension. At the center of debate is the military participation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and rival, Jihadi groups in Syria’s war.

The Lebanese share power in peculiar ways.  Half the parliament belongs to a Christian community of various denominations. The other half is Muslim: Sunnites, Shiites, Druze and Alawites. The President has to be a Maronite - Catholic, the Prime Minister a Sunnite and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite.

Many of Lebanon’s current leaders are former patrons of a civil war which ended in 1990 through Saudi-led mediation. Riyadh and Tehran influence Beirut with money, ideology and weapons.

In preparing for upcoming presidential elections in May, the new cabinet is trying to reach a consensus that Lebanon take a neutral stance in Syria’s conflict.

If suicide Jihadi explosions continue to target Hezbollah and the wider Lebanese Shiite communities, the next president would not be smoothly elected.

When the Syrian uprising erupted many Lebanese hoped it would lead to the swift removal of President Assad. But the rebellion morphed into a civil war threatening the entire region. Many support but few admire Assad.

The United Nations has already registered 935 000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon’s four-million population hosts close to a million Syrians and half a million Palestinians - the latter displaced by the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.

Hezbollah has an interesting history. This movement was formed to resist the 1982 Israeli invasion. This invasion led to an 18-year occupation of south Lebanon, the home territory of a marginalized Shiite community.  Israel invaded its northern neighbor to liquidate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which was conducting provocative operations from Lebanon against the Zionist state.  The PLO failed its military mission in Lebanon and elsewhere, but Hezbollah managed to end Israel’s 1982 occupation in 2000. Hezbollah gradually replaced the PLO as a self-assigned “protector” of Lebanon and “defender” of future Palestine.  

Basking in local and regional popularity, Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel’s departure and evolved into a state-within-a-state. It expanded humanitarian services and diversified, competing in elections and assuming cabinet positions. Hezbollah is now the dominant political party in Lebanon and an active partner of Assad.  For admirers, Hezbollah, the Party of God, is known as “The Resistance.”  For critics, this party is an illegitimate, Iran-funded, Shiite militia.

Hezbollah’s first miscalculation may have been taking on Israel as its own primary adversary, “until victory.” Its ideologues should know better: Israel could only be contained through Arab unified action and pluralist state building, not through questionable, outmoded, poorly planned, asymmetrical use of force.  

Hezbollah’s second miscalculation may have been its participation in the Syrian civil war. By fighting along with the Syrian regime Hezbollah antagonizes most Syrians, many Lebanese and the majority of Sunnis. The Resistance also risks devastating defeat should the balance of power in Syria change in favor of the opposition.

Hezbollah is not ideologically committed to President Assad. It pragmatically supports Damascus rulers to survive and protect the Shiite communities in Lebanon and Syria from likely revenge, should this ruler be ousted militarily.

There are additional concerns. Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria has unintentionally revived militarism among Lebanon’s rival communities.  Since renewed civil war in Lebanon is no longer unimaginable, the Lebanese Forces (a previously demilitarized Maronite militia) has covertly remobilized to “defend” the Christian community; other groups are, with increasing frequency, committing suicide acts to “defend Sunni Islam” in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq; and Palestinian refugees carry arms to protect their camps.

In three stages and three years, the conflict in Syria has progressed from a peaceful uprising to a local civil war, and lately to a regional sectarian conflict. This Syrian based, wider conflict is now between insecure Gulf State Sunnite leaders and Iran’s clerical hierarchy.   Never has Hezbollah been as vulnerable to local and regional enemies as it is today. And never has the country, which Hezbollah was created to protect, been as exposed.

Is there any sign of hope?  With luck, international diplomacy could save Lebanon. The Syrian conflict could be resolved politically if the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran succeed.

Should Syria’s conflict end in 2014, Hezbollah could survive as a political party, swallow its pride and integrate its military wing with the Lebanese army. With progress in Syria, Lebanon may have a new president and a better future.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iran key to Syria's conflict

Iran Could Play a Critical Role in Syrian Regime Change

West Palm Beach

Jan 26, 2014.

The Geneva II conference on Syria’s war, started January 22 in Montreux, Switzerland, and resumed on Friday 24, in Geneva.

The tyrannical Assad regime and a cluster of Islamic militant groups are competing at destroying Syria to “save” it and to “liberate” it respectively. The regime is supported by Iran and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah. The divided opposition, including a variety of terror groups, is financed by Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states and myriad international sources.

Unless Saudi Arabia and Iran start cooperating in dealing with Syria Geneva II is doomed. To replace President Assad in Damascus, Tehran could be assigned to engage in delicate political surgery. In a misguided step by the United Nations, Iran was “timed- out” from the decision making process.

While rebel leaders and their supporters were cajoled by the international community to attend the conference, President Assad was expected to end his rule and swallow his pride; and his ally, Iran, was excluded from the decision making process of the conference, a day before it started.

This conference aims to replace Assad in order to install a transitional government, as if dictators in power are good at compliance. Anyway, events have moved on over three years of a civil war. The solution for Syria’s chaos now is beyond the establishment of a national transition group. The challenge is to restore safety, free prisoners, enhance humanitarian aid and rebuild the unity of the state.

It may not be wise at this stage to treat the issue of Assad’s fate as the central deadlock in the conflict. The more attention the timing of Assad’s leaving receives the more difficult it will be to depose him and call for his departure.

While Secretary of State John Kerry is right in viewing President Assad as the primary source of trouble, Syria’s foreign minister Walid Mouallem is also justified in asserting that the Syrian people must decide for their future. It is not well known that nearly half of Syria’s society is still attached to the status quo, not because many like Assad, but because they fear the consequences of a sectarian war: massive revenge and permanent partitioning of the state.

Kerry has ignored the damaging role of the rebels in exporting the conflict beyond Syria’s borders; and Washington has embraced their patrons: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. And the Syrian regime has been not been honest in labeling the entire opposition as “terrorists”.

There is no easy way to depose Assad, given the strength of his military and the moderate support he still retains in mainstream society. In planning for Syria, attention is due to Assad’s popularity among minorities and business groups, who choose stability over freedom. Wide divisions in the opposition and severe deterioration in the quality of the struggle demand balanced diplomacy in easing this tyrant out. 

The end of Assad’s political term in office, due in a few months, may be the most feasible time for his exit from power. But his exit is not assured as he threatens to run for another term.

Assad has to go but his army must not go with him, or be dismembered.  Kerry has overlooked the importance of securing the cooperation of Iran in the challenging removal of Assad without dismantling his army.

Iran could make a behind-the-scene deal with Saudi Arabia and the US to ease out Assad. However Iran needs incentives to act. Three prospective rewards come to mind.

Neither Assad nor his Alawite community is religiously, ethnically or emotionally close to the Tehran regime. Tehran’s support for Damascus is a political alliance of convenience between Iran and Syria.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani would lean on Assad to end his term in order to secure a safe exit for his ally, win assurances for his (Alawite) community and other communities who have stood by him.

President Rouhani will gain international recognition and achieve desperately needed economic relief if he were to play a constructive role in Syria, a role which might enhance dialogue on the nuclear issues with the six world powers. Today, Syria for Iran is like Cuba was for the former Soviet Union, a costly resource drain.

In this soft diplomacy Rouhani would need a hand from Saudi Arabia. The Arabian Kingdom must realize that sectarianism is self destructive; it could eventually eliminate any throne.

Russia and the US must make a deal to jointly urge Iran and Saudi Arabia to contain sectarian politics and find common in serving the region.  It would be a breakthrough for Syria and the entire region.

Geneva II is a western model of conflict resolution addressing an Eastern crisis.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tunis Model for Arab Spring

 

Feb 11, 2014

West Palm Beach

 

 

 

The sociopolitical context for political reform in the Arab world is immensely challenging. As a result few Arab countries will have an easy way to democracy. Miraculously, Tunisia has already shown the start of a genuine Arab awakening.

 

This homogeneous North African Arab country was the first to mobilize public dissent peacefully, to oust an oppressive ruler (Ben Ali) easily, to run a free election, to form a pluralist government- not so easily, and to create a liberal constitution through nationwide, painful and rancorous debate. More significantly, after the departure of Ben Ali, Tunisia succeeded in replacing a new Islamist-led government - which failed to bring about the expected post revolutionary reforms - with a secular government.  Still, the new government has allowed Muslim representatives to share power in a pluralist cabinet. Elections for a new president and national assembly are scheduled to take place this year. To be realistic, Tunisia is not yet immune to reactionary forces. 

 

Consider the contrasting “Arab Spring” developments in Egypt. In early 2011, dramatic street demonstrations ousted President Mubarak, a secular dictator. A democratic election, the first in the country’s history, ushered in the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood Party. The Brotherhood did not live up to the aspirations of the people. A second wave of massive protest led to the replacement of the Brotherhood with a secular, interim government dominated by the military. The new regime has so far failed to introduce reform.

 

A third round of revolutionary change may take place in Cairo at any time in the foreseeable future. For the moment, Egypt relies on Arab Gulf money to sustain a discouraging political status quo: an authoritarian regime suppressing a Muslim opposition under the pretext of protection of national security. For how long will Saudi Arabia be able to finance the military regime in Cairo? How effective will the Muslim Brotherhood be in their opposition to the status quo? And how long will it take for Egyptians to unite on a human rights-based agenda?

 

Libya presents another depressing story. The regime which replaced President Gaddafi has not been effective in bringing back stability and reform to this oil-rich country. Libyan tribal and militia culture is politically corrosive.

 

In Yemen the prognosis is even worse than in Libya. A tyrannical president was replaced by his vice president after covert Saudi and American diplomatic intervention. The country remains deeply divided- ethnically and ideologically- and highly unstable.

 

In Syria, the Arab Spring has morphed into a civil war backed by blunt as well as covert regional and international intervention. Syria’s conflict could last for years as long as Saudi Arabia and Iran continue to confront each other on Syrian soil.

 

Back to Tunisia. What makes this state a winner in the Arab Spring? 

 

Consider the contrast between Tunisia and Egypt in the social context of the Arab Spring. Four factors stand out. While Egyptian society is too obedient to religious authority, particularly on matters of family and gender laws, Tunisians respect their clerics without bowing to them. While the military in Egypt controls a major portion of the economy, the armed forces of Tunisia do not dabble with big business or manipulate politics. The economy is a major, favorable factor in the smaller country: only 5% of Egypt’s land is fertile, whereas in Tunisia two thirds of the land is cultivable. In Tunisia, civic society is vibrant and political parties are active; this is not the case in Egypt, where the government inhibits social and political enterprise.

 

Political contrast is also significant between Tunisia on one hand, and Libya, Syria and Yemen on the other. Despite the corruption and oppression of the Ben Ali regime, and the authoritarian rule of former President Bourghiba, Tunisia has never been led by a severe iron fist. But in Syria, Libya and Yemen the rulers have been consistently harsh and merciless. Tribal divisions in those three countries are strong but subservient to their dictators. Tunisia has not been vulnerable to tribal or sectarian strife. Ninety eight percent of Tunisia is Sunnite.  

 

Tunisia will undoubtedly face challenges and reversals in its march toward full democracy. But as long as the religious and military establishments remain distanced from politics the country will find its way forward.

 

If Tunisia continues on the path of democracy over this decade it would be a compelling regional model for state building. Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, the Arab world has been copying modernity from the West. It is time for the Arabs to build their own paradigm of social change. Tunisia may not be the only model; it will hopefully be one pattern to stimulate reform among neighbors. Once Egypt gets its act together it may provide another road map for countries that are overpopulated, deeply religious and economically challenged.

 

The Arab Spring will take time.