Lebanon Is Back On Track – But for How Long?

East Meredith, NY
grubeiz@comcast.net
June, 1, 2008

Lebanon has undergone intense changes over the last two weeks. What are those changes and what brought them about? Over the last three years Lebanon lost almost all of the post-civil war recovery that started in 1990.

In these three years Lebanon has witnessed over a dozen political assassinations, a devastating war with Israel, an 18 month open-strike, a prolonged battle between a fundamentalist militia and the national army within a Palestinian refugee camp, periodic inter-militia fighting, a reduced cabinet, a missing president, a non-functioning parliament, repeated airport closures, migration of skilled labor, and a spiraling national debt.

But suddenly in the second week of May, the political climate turned positive, and a five-day meeting in Doha, Qatar, produced a historic agreement between the Hezbollah-led opposition and the pro-West governing coalition. A consensus president, the former chief of armed forces, Michel Suleiman, was elected on May 23. It is still too early to tell if the ongoing preparation for a national unity government, the agreement for a new electoral law (that gives minorities better opportunity for competition in the parliament), and the inauguration of the new president constitute signs of normalization.

The sudden change in the political fortunes of Lebanon is not merely spontaneous recovery. Three factors explain this dramatic burst of rational problem solving: the tilt of power in favor of the opposition, improved relations among Lebanon’s neighbors, and preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections.

Power Shift

Lebanon’s pre-Doha government gradually lost its raison d’etre in the face of unraveling national security. Until recently, the government was able to control the opposition by accusing Hezbollah of undermining the state, by acting as the guardian of international law-against outlawed militia presence, by maintaining a minimum level of law and order, and by securing much needed aid from Washington and the Western world.

But extended political paralysis weakened the government considerably. Its inability to command the national army to confront Hezbollah was a clear indication that a new formula of governance was due. The Lebanese saw implications of this tilt in power and so did their government and the rulers of other Arab countries.

After an eighteen-month struggle between the opposition and the government ruling coalition, the former has finally reached a position of advantage. With the help of the secular Christian movement, known as the Reform and Change party, the opposition tightened pressure on the government using measured tactics of social influence. The tactics included withdrawal from the cabinet, an open strike in the heart of the capital, a mass media campaign, a strengthening of relations with Iran and Syria, and an alliance with left-leaning political parties. But Hezbollah’s most intimidating measure was to build its militia positions in the south and the east of the country and in Beirut.

On the whole, Hezbollah has been peaceful in its domestic resistance. It has projected the image of a political force and a national guard against external danger. However, its recent short bout of fighting with Sunni and Druze armed groups somewhat tainted its image and strengthened the thesis that this movement is essentially a militia-based culture. In those few days of fighting, Hezbollah showed that it could derail the country into chaos; the government took notice of Hezbollah’s military muscle.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah has been able to make its case that Lebanon needs a new defense strategy, that Israel poses a regional military threat, and that the Lebanese armed forces are not capable of defending the country. Lebanese, from all backgrounds and levels of education, argue emotionally about Hezbollah’s future in the country. Hezbollah’s arms remain Lebanon’s greatest dilemma.

Talking to the Enemy

The shift in power in Lebanon is one reason that the Doha Accord has brought a new regime of power-sharing. The second reason is the recent burgeoning of regional talks. Despite the ongoing bitter debate in America about the wisdom of “talking with the enemy,” in the Middle East politicians are currently talking to each other across hostile borders.

Syria talks with Israel through Turkey. The newly elected Lebanese president sets a respectful tone in addressing the concerns of Damascus. Syria takes a friendlier tone with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Iran and Saudi Arabia exchange visits. The French President plans a trip to Lebanon and Syria. Israel and Hezbollah whisper about the exchange of prisoners.

Washington watches the rapid changes in Lebanon without being able to influence its future course. It has supported the government unconditionally, and it has consistently threatened the opposition. Washington’s position is that the Lebanese opposition can do no good as long as Hezbollah is armed.

Visitors from around the world plan to travel to Lebanon this summer. But last week the State Department issued a security alert advising Americans not to go to Lebanon, due to anticipated insecurities associated with Hezbollah.

An Eye on the Future

The next milestone in Lebanon’s future is a new parliament to be elected in the spring of 2009. The Beirut Center for Research estimates that Hezbollah, the Reform and Change party, and their opposition partners will win the majority of the parliamentary seats in these coming elections.

The Doha Accord situates the opposition today as a significant minority in the cabinet with one third of the seats. But the opposition plans on being the majority in the 2009 parliamentary elections, and if that happens, the opposition will become the ruling majority.

Not to minimize its influence, Doha was a package of political compromises. On one side, Hezbollah with its allies, Syria and Iran, are satisfied to have Michel Suleiman as president, a leader who can tolerate militia culture. On the other side, the majority coalition is satisfied to retain the position of a pro-West prime minister of the coalition’s choice.

Doha has put Lebanon again on the democracy track. It will be up to the Lebanese to decide if the country will be run in the future by ballots or bullets. Finding a creative and diplomatic solution for Hezbollah’s arms has become a priority. Suleiman is entrusted with opening critical negotiations with Hezbollah on the future of militias in a revitalized policy of national defense. The new government will not have the needed time or clout to radically reform the system. The hope for comprehensive reform rests in the process and outcome of the 2009 elections.

Right now, the Lebanese are thinking ballots, and they want the rest of the world to celebrate with them.

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