Current Arab elections are theatrical

Current Arab elections are theatrical

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

May 21, 2014, Washington DC.

 

Five Arab countries (Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) elect their top political leaders this spring under dubious circumstances. Political business is returning to “normal”. And normal politics in the Arab world is far from being so.  It is as if the Arab Spring has not taken place, or it has no permanent impact on the future.

These electoral events have the attributes of political comedy which covers up tragic reality.  Let us first look at Syria. President Bashar al Assad runs for presidential elections on June 3, for a third seven-year term. He ignores the fact that his father governed Syria for 30 years before his 14 years of a tight-fisted reign, which caused a national uprising three years ago.  The uprising morphed into a civil war; the initial peaceful rebellion was met with state brutality. The elections are taking place in an environment of a catastrophic civil war which has, so far, displaced half the population, created 1.5 million refugees and killed 160 thousand people.  Sadly, Assad acts as the savior of a broken society; he sees the next election as legitimizing the extension of his mandate.

In Egypt General Abdel Fattah al Sisi is running for elections on May 26.  Sisi resigned from the position of head of the military after staging a coup against an unpopular, albeit democratically elected president: Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. A military government now manages the country with brutal rules against political dissent.

Both Sisi and Assad are expected to win these two rigged elections.

In Algeria President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika won a third term in April. Bouteflika’s legitimacy should have expired by now due to longevity of service, corruption and poor health. The ailing leader is now a figure head in a political system buttressed by the army and a civilian elite of old time opportunists.

In Iraq Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, who has been in power for eight years, won enough seats in the parliamentary elections which took place on April 30. Maliki has won a third term but he continues to face strong opposition from all sectors of society. Maliki is not as ruthless as Saddam Hussein, but he is viewed as a tyrant by the Iraqi Sunnite community. He is also disliked by a large section of his own Shiite community.  Iraq has been in a continuing sectarian civil war, where Sunnites oppose the dominance of Shiite leadership. 

In Lebanon the circumstances of the presidential elections, which are due before May 25, are also frustrating, but here the situation is different: there is no tyranny in Lebanon but a feeble state. In the past Syria covertly manipulated the electoral process in Lebanon. In this round of presidential elections Iran-supported Syria and US-supported, Saudi Arabia exert equally competing influence on Lebanese politics; a condition of paralysis exists at points of transition. In the past month the parliament met four times and failed to elect a new president, for absence of quorum. Tension grows for lack of agreement on how to resolve this electoral impasse before the deadline of May 25. The current president, Michel Suleiman, could vacate his post without being replaced, in which case the cabinet of ministers will collectively assume the power of the presidency, as dictated by the constitution. The Lebanese are used to political cliff-hanging. Among the 12 or so presidential candidates one statesman, Ziad Baroud, stands out in credibility, leadership and popularity - across political parties and religious communities. If a moderate, reconciliatory figure is elected, Lebanon will have six years of stability, but the chances seem to be slim for elections to occur this week.

In 2011, the Arab Spring brought pride for the region; in contrast, 2014 will bring shame.  Rulers are trying to bury the Arab Spring with predictable elections. The historical thrust of the Arab Spring can only be suppressed for a while but not permanently buried.

 

Current Arab elections are theatrical

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

May 21, 2014, Washington DC.

 

Five Arab countries (Syria, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon) elect their top political leaders this spring under dubious circumstances. Political business is returning to “normal”. And normal politics in the Arab world is far from being so.  It is as if the Arab Spring has not taken place, or it has no permanent impact on the future.

These electoral events have the attributes of political comedy which covers up tragic reality.  Let us first look at Syria. President Bashar al Assad runs for presidential elections on June 3, for a third seven-year term. He ignores the fact that his father governed Syria for 30 years before his 14 years of a tight-fisted reign, which caused a national uprising three years ago.  The uprising morphed into a civil war; the initial peaceful rebellion was met with state brutality. The elections are taking place in an environment of a catastrophic civil war which has, so far, displaced half the population, created 1.5 million refugees and killed 160 thousand people.  Sadly, Assad acts as the savior of a broken society; he sees the next election as legitimizing the extension of his mandate.

In Egypt General Abdel Fattah al Sisi is running for elections on May 26.  Sisi resigned from the position of head of the military after staging a coup against an unpopular, albeit democratically elected president: Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. A military government now manages the country with brutal rules against political dissent.

Both Sisi and Assad are expected to win these two rigged elections.

In Algeria President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika won a third term in April. Bouteflika’s legitimacy should have expired by now due to longevity of service, corruption and poor health. The ailing leader is now a figure head in a political system buttressed by the army and a civilian elite of old time opportunists.

In Iraq Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki, who has been in power for eight years, won enough seats in the parliamentary elections which took place on April 30. Maliki has won a third term but he continues to face strong opposition from all sectors of society. Maliki is not as ruthless as Saddam Hussein, but he is viewed as a tyrant by the Iraqi Sunnite community. He is also disliked by a large section of his own Shiite community.  Iraq has been in a continuing sectarian civil war, where Sunnites oppose the dominance of Shiite leadership. 

In Lebanon the circumstances of the presidential elections, which are due before May 25, are also frustrating, but here the situation is different: there is no tyranny in Lebanon but a feeble state. In the past Syria covertly manipulated the electoral process in Lebanon. In this round of presidential elections Iran-supported Syria and US-supported, Saudi Arabia exert equally competing influence on Lebanese politics; a condition of paralysis exists at points of transition. In the past month the parliament met four times and failed to elect a new president, for absence of quorum. Tension grows for lack of agreement on how to resolve this electoral impasse before the deadline of May 25. The current president, Michel Suleiman, could vacate his post without being replaced, in which case the cabinet of ministers will collectively assume the power of the presidency, as dictated by the constitution. The Lebanese are used to political cliff-hanging. Among the 12 or so presidential candidates one statesman, Ziad Baroud, stands out in credibility, leadership and popularity - across political parties and religious communities. If a moderate, reconciliatory figure is elected, Lebanon will have six years of stability, but the chances seem to be slim for elections to occur this week.

In 2011, the Arab Spring brought pride for the region; in contrast, 2014 will bring shame.  Rulers are trying to bury the Arab Spring with predictable elections. The historical thrust of the Arab Spring can only be suppressed for a while but not permanently buried.

 

 

 

   

 

 

   

Debate is about occupation, not Israel's moral character

Debate is about occupation not moral character of Israel

May 1, 2014

 

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

 

West Palm Beach, FL.

In the Mideast, the “apartheid” controversy is the latest distraction from political problem solving.

If there’s no two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict soon, Israel risks becoming an ‘apartheid state’, Secretary of State John Kerry opined last Friday. Kerry spoke in a recent meeting of the Trilateral Commission.

Seeking a “second opinion”, I asked a US political science professor emeritus what he thought of Kerry’s statement. The professor, who prefers to be anonymous, was clear: I think he was right - I'm sorry he felt forced to apologize.  If "apartheid" is taken to mean one ethnic group depriving another of basic human rights and treating them as a subclass, then "apartheid" would correctly describe the situation if Israel were to continue to take over Palestinian territories and absorb the local populations into a single state.

Our hard working and well meaning Secretary has taken bold steps to try to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict over the last nine month. But in defending himself Kerry may have sent mixed messages. While he apologized for the use of the term apartheid, he reminded his critics that he was not the first to use the “A” word. In fact, President Carter wrote a book on this subject. Israel’s earliest leaders like Moshe Dayan and Aba Eban called for a two-state policy.  The positions of Israeli Ex-Prime Ministers Olmert and Ehud Barack implied the risk of apartheid drift.  Five former Israeli national security chiefs cautioned against the continuation of the occupation in a recent film which won international acclaim: The Gatekeepers.

Unfortunately, Kerry’s apology may have sounded to some as a confession: if I could rewind the tape, I would have chosen a different word to describe my firm belief that the only way in the long term to have a Jewish state and two nations and two peoples living side by side in peace and security is through a two state solution.

It is sad that Kerry is the third top American official in the current administration to be intimidated for speaking his mind on Israel’s occupation policies. During his first term President Obama spent precious political capital in confronting Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding “illegal Israeli settlements”. The president quickly learned the limits of his ability in shaping US foreign policy on Israel. He no longer talks about the settlements or of “difference” with Netanyahu.

The second US leader to be Israel- trained was US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. The ordeal Hagel received from Israel and its US allies in defending his candidacy for the Defense post left him a clear message: in Congress Israel is first.

Now Kerry is the third top leader in this administration to pay dearly for speaking the truth on Israel’s risks of continuing to live with an occupation that is likely to undermine its security, its Jewish character and ultimately its democracy.

It might help for Israelis to realize that it is the occupation - neither the absence of democracy nor the character of Israel’s society- which is being challenged to change. Naturally, the occupation is a social system which breeds violence and engenders inequality between the occupied and the occupier, whether it is in setting up standards of security, defining political freedoms, provision of social opportunity or maintenance of defense.

The debate of the Arab Israeli conflict is often derailed, like the peace process is derailed, by word spin. The real issue is the cost of the occupation to the occupier and the occupied, not how prone Israel is to becoming an apartheid state.

Reference to apartheid should not be an automatic label of ill will to Israel.

 

Israel Palestine: Peacemaking is hard between unequal adversaries

( in Palm Beach Post)

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

April 18, 20014

West Palm Beach

 

Nine months of peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) have failed. Each side took steps away from diplomacy. Israel reneged on the release of Palestinian prisoners.  The PA unilaterally applied to join UN agencies.  Israel announced plans to expand settlements in the occupied territories.  Palestinians refused to recognize Israel as a Jewish State. Israel suspended the reimbursement of Palestinian tax money to the PA. Palestinians feel betrayed.

Even in Israel the occupation policy is criticized. An April 15 Haaretz editorial offers sobering words : The Defense Minister’s green light to appropriate land in the West Bank places him in the extreme right and shatters Israelis’ hopes for resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/1.585694

As Washington will probably rescue the talks without changing  strategy the prospects for a comprehensive settlement in the near future are slim. The underlying cause of diplomatic failure is not shortage of time or broken promises; the root cause is power asymmetry between the protagonists. Israel has never been as strong, prosperous and diplomatically indulged. In contrast, the Palestinians have never been as demoralized, stressed and divided. Unchallenged power permits Israel to dictate peace, and there is so much abuse Palestinians can take.

Steps toward peace have been taken in the past but only when Israel felt the threat of collective Arab action. The 1979 Camp David Accord was negotiated in the aftermath of the 1973 war, the only war in which Arab’s collective power seriously endangered Israel. Washington’s military support of Israel enabled Tel-Aviv to win this war. But Egyptians and Syrians then shocked Israel by launching a surprise attack which cost lives and sobered generals on both sides.

Similarly, the 1993 Oslo framework for peace between Israel and the PLO was negotiated after the first Intifada ( awakening in Arabic) . In 1987 the West Bank and Gaza erupted in a peaceful revolt against the Israeli occupation.  The Oslo Accord was followed by a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994. The intifada was well received in the Arab world and the wider international community. Israel took notice of the emergence of an empowered Palestinian national movement. The Oslo plan was facilitated by European mediation, but Israel paid attention to peace when it witness impressive Palestinian self determination. The Oslo agreement was derailed by unfortunate events; the Jordan treaty has survived.

Fast forward two decades, the landscape of power in the region is different today. The Arab states are overwhelmed with domestic problems. The Arab Spring has marginalized the Palestinian question and morphed into fratricide between the secular and the religious.

And in Israel the trend is the reverse: the rise of God politics and the ascendance of settlers.   Supported by the military, six hundred thousand tough-minded Israelis now live in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The settlers are anti Palestinian, anti-Arab and anti-Islamic.

Hyper nationalism fuels power consciousness in peace negotiations. For a fundamentalist- of any religion- compromise is equivalent to betrayal.

The Palestinians are forced to seek peace through international diplomacy. They should not be blamed for joining the United Nations to advance their cause for statehood. What else can they do when their top leaders are not serving them, their occupier denies the occupation, their region is in turmoil and Washington is constantly pressured by the pro- Israel lobby?

By joining the UN the Palestinians might strengthen a peaceful strategy for achieving their national independence. A growing international movement against Israel’s occupation is slowly taking roots in Europe, the US, Canada, Australia and elsewhere.

In their New York Times Sunday Review (April 11)essay Are Iran and Israel trading Places?, Abbas Milani and Israel Waismel-Manor highlight the significance of changing world sentiments toward the occupation: From academic boycotts to calls for divestment on American university campuses to the unwillingness of more and more European financial institutions to invest in or partner with Israeli companies and banks that operate in the West Bank, the “B.D.S.” movement ( Boycott Divestment and Sanctions) is gaining momentum.  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/12/opinion/sunday/are-iran-and-israel-trading-places.html?_r=0

At some point in the future world opinion will bring Israel back to the peace table; if only Palestinians could adamantly stick to peaceful resistance.

When the two parties reach a degree of parity in status peace will come. Today, the occupied is desperate to end the occupation but the occupier is eager to expand it.

 

 

Egypt : Al Sisis crackdown on opposition will backfire

Al-Sisi’s brutal crackdown on opposition will backfire

 

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

 

April 5, 2014

 

West Palm Beach, Florida

 

The course of revolutions is unpredictable. Three years ago, while it was Tunisia which ignited the Arab Spring, it was Egypt’sTahreer Square which displayed the richest moments of struggle for freedom. The multitudes of peaceful protestors in Tahreer - young and old, Christian and Muslim, religious and secular, educated and illiterate - all rushed to the public square to express their national aspirations for a better world through a responsive government.  Sadly, the course has changed dramatically.

 

The main opposition to the current Egyptian government is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a social movement and a political party with deep cultural roots in Egyptian society. The MB won a democratic presidential election, a first in Egypt’s history, after an uprising pressured President Hosni Mubarak to resign in February 2011. But then, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to introduce reform and quickly became unpopular. A second uprising gave the self- serving military its opportunity to ease the MB regime out of power and replace it.

 

The coup against the MB government effectively substituted an Islamist sectarian autocracy with a military one. With eight months in power, the new military-backed regime may be sinking deeper into political quicksand.

 

The current military establishment in Egypt is trying to tame the Muslim Brotherhood. In recent days, an Egyptian local court sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood protestors to death for attacking a police station causing the death of a policeman last August. The judgment was quick, evidence was thin, defense was timid; 400 of the accused were tried in absentia.

 

Untold damage to the regimes’ local and international public relations comes from vindictive initiatives such as issuing  collective death sentences, clamping down on private international aid organizations and locking up local and foreign journalists. 

 

The current government cannot wipe out MB violence through collective, unjust punitive measures. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Algeria, illustrate the futility of curing communal violence with government-backed violence. But the current leadership seems to think Egypt is an exception.

 

For many Egyptians it is not easy to empathize with the MB social and political agendas. The Brothers made all the mistakes they could in a single year of governance. But had the MB been allowed to finish their term they would most likely have been replaced through the ballot box; the coup interrupted the process of democratic transformation. Adding insult to injury, local media unwittingly help legitimize military rule by demonizing the MB. 

 

The heavy handed group death sentence could be easily reversed in the near future. It is hard to believe that the higher courts in Cairo would rubber stamp such a strong dose of collective capital punishment.

 

What could be going on within the top leadership that would allow  such  atrocities not to be checked? Such irrational policies may indicate that the top leadership is not running the country with a single tight fist; there seem to be serious internal divisions and contradictions throughout the government.

 

Regardless of how the court decision evolves, collective punishment is likely to turn the Muslim Brothers into martyrs. In a highly religious society martyrdom turns failure to victory and transforms trouble-makers to dangerous “reformers”. Certain extreme elements in the MB have already taken up arms to fight the regime with acts of terror.

 

Fearing a new uprising the generals plan to hold on to power through a rushed presidential election.  The upcoming presidential elections follow last year’s dubious efforts of revising the nation’s constitution by a committee appointed by the regime. 

 

General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi appears to be the strong man of the current regime. He is running for the office of the president. Al-Sisi’s popularity is rising due to heightened anger against  the MB, excessive trust in the military and propensity for hero worship. Today’s Abdul Fattah al-Sisi may be eager to emulate the iconic Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Nasser of the 1960s. Regrettably, as of yet, there are no indications that al-Sisi will have strong opponents in this election.

 

Egypt is too stressed to tolerate poor governance for too long. A new uprising may emerge as this government faces severe economic hardships and runs out of money coming from Arab Gulf states and other sources of foreign aid.

 

Worse things could happen. Continued  oppression of  the Muslim Brotherhood, might ignite  a civil war of devastating consequences .

 

The Arab League, US and European Union should apply additional pressure on Egypt’s current administration to run free and fair elections.

 

Only competitive elections could re-open the road to political freedoms and to a much needed dialogue between the religious and secular communities of Egypt.

 

If al-Sisi is a real leader, and not a front man to a fractured military establishment, he will listen to all his communities and allies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Al-Sisi’s brutal crackdown on opposition will backfire

 

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

 

April 5, 2014

 

West Palm Beach, Florida

 

The course of revolutions is unpredictable. Three years ago, while it was Tunisia which ignited the Arab Spring, it was Egypt’sTahreer Square which displayed the richest moments of struggle for freedom. The multitudes of peaceful protestors in Tahreer - young and old, Christian and Muslim, religious and secular, educated and illiterate - all rushed to the public square to express their national aspirations for a better world through a responsive government.  Sadly, the course has changed dramatically.

 

The main opposition to the current Egyptian government is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), a social movement and a political party with deep cultural roots in Egyptian society. The MB won a democratic presidential election, a first in Egypt’s history, after an uprising pressured President Hosni Mubarak to resign in February 2011. But then, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to introduce reform and quickly became unpopular. A second uprising gave the self- serving military its opportunity to ease the MB regime out of power and replace it.

 

The coup against the MB government effectively substituted an Islamist sectarian autocracy with a military one. With eight months in power, the new military-backed regime may be sinking deeper into political quicksand.

 

The current military establishment in Egypt is trying to tame the Muslim Brotherhood. In recent days, an Egyptian local court sentenced 529 Muslim Brotherhood protestors to death for attacking a police station causing the death of a policeman last August. The judgment was quick, evidence was thin, defense was timid; 400 of the accused were tried in absentia.

 

Untold damage to the regimes’ local and international public relations comes from vindictive initiatives such as issuing  collective death sentences, clamping down on private international aid organizations and locking up local and foreign journalists. 

 

The current government cannot wipe out MB violence through collective, unjust punitive measures. Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Algeria, illustrate the futility of curing communal violence with government-backed violence. But the current leadership seems to think Egypt is an exception.

 

For many Egyptians it is not easy to empathize with the MB social and political agendas. The Brothers made all the mistakes they could in a single year of governance. But had the MB been allowed to finish their term they would most likely have been replaced through the ballot box; the coup interrupted the process of democratic transformation. Adding insult to injury, local media unwittingly help legitimize military rule by demonizing the MB. 

 

The heavy handed group death sentence could be easily reversed in the near future. It is hard to believe that the higher courts in Cairo would rubber stamp such a strong dose of collective capital punishment.

 

What could be going on within the top leadership that would allow  such  atrocities not to be checked? Such irrational policies may indicate that the top leadership is not running the country with a single tight fist; there seem to be serious internal divisions and contradictions throughout the government.

 

Regardless of how the court decision evolves, collective punishment is likely to turn the Muslim Brothers into martyrs. In a highly religious society martyrdom turns failure to victory and transforms trouble-makers to dangerous “reformers”. Certain extreme elements in the MB have already taken up arms to fight the regime with acts of terror.

 

Fearing a new uprising the generals plan to hold on to power through a rushed presidential election.  The upcoming presidential elections follow last year’s dubious efforts of revising the nation’s constitution by a committee appointed by the regime. 

 

General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi appears to be the strong man of the current regime. He is running for the office of the president. Al-Sisi’s popularity is rising due to heightened anger against  the MB, excessive trust in the military and propensity for hero worship. Today’s Abdul Fattah al-Sisi may be eager to emulate the iconic Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Nasser of the 1960s. Regrettably, as of yet, there are no indications that al-Sisi will have strong opponents in this election.

 

Egypt is too stressed to tolerate poor governance for too long. A new uprising may emerge as this government faces severe economic hardships and runs out of money coming from Arab Gulf states and other sources of foreign aid.

 

Worse things could happen. Continued  oppression of  the Muslim Brotherhood, might ignite  a civil war of devastating consequences .

 

The Arab League, US and European Union should apply additional pressure on Egypt’s current administration to run free and fair elections.

 

Only competitive elections could re-open the road to political freedoms and to a much needed dialogue between the religious and secular communities of Egypt.

 

If al-Sisi is a real leader, and not a front man to a fractured military establishment, he will listen to all his communities and allies.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Is a Jewish state label a deal breaker?

Published in Palm Beach Post on March 24, 2014

West Palm Beach

March 17, 2014

The promotion of a Jewish state promotes the creation of a parallel Islamic Palestinian state. A region obsessed with political Islam on one side and by political Judaism on the other has no future.

Israel insists on inserting a provocative pre-condition in the ongoing peace talks: Palestinian recognition of Israel as the “Jewish state.”  Over the past eight months US Secretary of State John Kerry has worked hard to bring Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the negotiating table. So far no progress is in evidence.

Israel is no longer immune to domestic reactionary thinking; Zionist ideology has shifted to the right. There are many reasons for this shift. Two factors stand out. Russian-born immigrants and the Orthodox community play a larger role in current Israeli politics. The size and influence of these two communities have grown. The second factor is the widening instability in Arab society; Israel is stronger militarily, and therefore feels entitled to new demands at the negotiating table.

Discouraged by lack of movement in the peace talks, Kerry has drafted a framework of suggestions for a future phase of negotiations. Here are some of Kerry’s expected ideas that have come to light.

In a two-state solution Palestine and Israel would compromise on decisive issues. The Palestinian refugees would receive financial compensation and could return only to the West Bank and Gaza, foreseen as the new Palestinian state. Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders but retain about 80 % of the existing settlements. Land swaps between the two states would preserve the proportion of Palestinian land ownership to 22% of Historic Palestine (or Eretz Israel). Part of East Jerusalem would be shared. Elaborate military measures would ensure Israel’s security on Jordan’s border and in the wider region. Palestine would be demilitarized.  And one more expected concession: the Palestinian Authority would be asked to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.  This new Israeli demand was not part of Oslo or Camp David accords.

Kerry’s framework will be announced soon. The framework addresses the enormous humanitarian and political problems of the occupation and security issues.  In adding the provocative demand for Arab recognition of Israel as the Jewish state Kerry has unintentionally overloaded the agenda of peace making.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is aware that Arab leaders, facing a rising tide of Islamic revolts, are not in a position to recognize the Zionist state as a Jewish state. Is the Prime Minister making an unreasonable request to delay discussions on ending the occupation?

The Jewish state identity is provocative even within the Jewish world. Not all of Israel’s leaders champion the idea of the Jewish state and its inherent implications on minority rights. Many in Israel and its Diaspora do not wish to see a “secular and democratic” state transform to a faith-based entity.  Israel has a fragile demographic makeup - a secular majority and a conservative religious minority that holds disproportionate political power.

Israel is not totally Jewish. Every fourth Israeli is non-Jewish. Twenty percent of the population of Israel is of Palestinian origin.  These Palestinian are natives of former Palestine.  These Palestinians, who currently receive less than a full share of their rights and privileges, are citizens of Israel. They are labeled “Israeli Arabs.” Israeli Arabs will feel even more alien and disadvantaged if they live in a country designated Jewish.

Israel’s leadership argues that the Jewish state will retain its democratic nature and continue to respect the rights of its minorities. This sounds sensible, but for the five million Arabs who now live in Israeli controlled areas, and for the 300 million Arabs who live in the regional neighborhood, a Jewish state appears sectarian and provocative.

A peace process leading nowhere is counterproductive. If Israel is unwilling to forge peace with the Arab world today it should declare the peace process dead. To continue to expand settlements, tighten civil rights on its Arab minorities and to ask the Palestinian Authority to bless a Jewish state does not serve any side of this conflict.

The region drifts to a one-state scenario, not a one-state solution. To assume that Kerry’s framework is capable of radically changing the prospects of peace is to ignore the disheartening outcome of similar initiatives of the past.

 

Lebanon, Hezbollah futute are in Syria's balance

Published in Palm Beach Post on Monday March 3, 2014

Lebanon’s fate lies in Syria’s future

Ghassan Michel Rubeiz

It took ten months for Lebanon to form a new government.  This lengthy delay is symptomatic of rising national tension. At the center of debate is the military participation of Lebanon’s Hezbollah and rival, Jihadi groups in Syria’s war.

The Lebanese share power in peculiar ways.  Half the parliament belongs to a Christian community of various denominations. The other half is Muslim: Sunnites, Shiites, Druze and Alawites. The President has to be a Maronite - Catholic, the Prime Minister a Sunnite and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shiite.

Many of Lebanon’s current leaders are former patrons of a civil war which ended in 1990 through Saudi-led mediation. Riyadh and Tehran influence Beirut with money, ideology and weapons.

In preparing for upcoming presidential elections in May, the new cabinet is trying to reach a consensus that Lebanon take a neutral stance in Syria’s conflict.

If suicide Jihadi explosions continue to target Hezbollah and the wider Lebanese Shiite communities, the next president would not be smoothly elected.

When the Syrian uprising erupted many Lebanese hoped it would lead to the swift removal of President Assad. But the rebellion morphed into a civil war threatening the entire region. Many support but few admire Assad.

The United Nations has already registered 935 000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Lebanon’s four-million population hosts close to a million Syrians and half a million Palestinians - the latter displaced by the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.

Hezbollah has an interesting history. This movement was formed to resist the 1982 Israeli invasion. This invasion led to an 18-year occupation of south Lebanon, the home territory of a marginalized Shiite community.  Israel invaded its northern neighbor to liquidate the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which was conducting provocative operations from Lebanon against the Zionist state.  The PLO failed its military mission in Lebanon and elsewhere, but Hezbollah managed to end Israel’s 1982 occupation in 2000. Hezbollah gradually replaced the PLO as a self-assigned “protector” of Lebanon and “defender” of future Palestine.  

Basking in local and regional popularity, Hezbollah refused to disarm after Israel’s departure and evolved into a state-within-a-state. It expanded humanitarian services and diversified, competing in elections and assuming cabinet positions. Hezbollah is now the dominant political party in Lebanon and an active partner of Assad.  For admirers, Hezbollah, the Party of God, is known as “The Resistance.”  For critics, this party is an illegitimate, Iran-funded, Shiite militia.

Hezbollah’s first miscalculation may have been taking on Israel as its own primary adversary, “until victory.” Its ideologues should know better: Israel could only be contained through Arab unified action and pluralist state building, not through questionable, outmoded, poorly planned, asymmetrical use of force.  

Hezbollah’s second miscalculation may have been its participation in the Syrian civil war. By fighting along with the Syrian regime Hezbollah antagonizes most Syrians, many Lebanese and the majority of Sunnis. The Resistance also risks devastating defeat should the balance of power in Syria change in favor of the opposition.

Hezbollah is not ideologically committed to President Assad. It pragmatically supports Damascus rulers to survive and protect the Shiite communities in Lebanon and Syria from likely revenge, should this ruler be ousted militarily.

There are additional concerns. Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria has unintentionally revived militarism among Lebanon’s rival communities.  Since renewed civil war in Lebanon is no longer unimaginable, the Lebanese Forces (a previously demilitarized Maronite militia) has covertly remobilized to “defend” the Christian community; other groups are, with increasing frequency, committing suicide acts to “defend Sunni Islam” in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq; and Palestinian refugees carry arms to protect their camps.

In three stages and three years, the conflict in Syria has progressed from a peaceful uprising to a local civil war, and lately to a regional sectarian conflict. This Syrian based, wider conflict is now between insecure Gulf State Sunnite leaders and Iran’s clerical hierarchy.   Never has Hezbollah been as vulnerable to local and regional enemies as it is today. And never has the country, which Hezbollah was created to protect, been as exposed.

Is there any sign of hope?  With luck, international diplomacy could save Lebanon. The Syrian conflict could be resolved politically if the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran succeed.

Should Syria’s conflict end in 2014, Hezbollah could survive as a political party, swallow its pride and integrate its military wing with the Lebanese army. With progress in Syria, Lebanon may have a new president and a better future.