US denial in Iraq: withdrawal symptoms

Palm Beach Gardens, March 24, 2008

Grubeiz@comcast.net

The continuation of the US-led war in Iraq, which is now in its sixth year, is fueled by three elements of a questionable mindset: our feelings of invincibility in war, our fear of transfer of terror from Baghdad to Washington, and our anticipation of regional wars in the aftermath of US troop withdrawal.

Let us first examine the “invincibility” outlook, which is a predisposition of denial. Americans are not used to losing wars. For a country that spends more than the rest of the world’s total military budget on defense, losing in war is not an option, especially for generals and policy makers. Vietnam was the first war to be lost. Many still have the arrogant belief that losses in Vietnam could have turned into victory had US troops stayed longer. Similarly, in the face of accumulating death and destruction in Iraq, there is a conviction that the war can be won. American triumphalists do not realize that their occupying forces are a large part of the problem and not the solution. Staying the course in Iraq ignores the fact that Middle Easterners consider the US occupation a dictatorship. Arabs consider the occupation a neo-colonial social order. In Iraq the US is fighting local insurgents directly as well as regional groups covertly. Can a force of 170 thousand soldiers maintain law and order in a vast country with power shifting insurgencies, fratricidal factions and border nations that consider the US a colonial presence?

Now let us examine the second factor that is inhibiting US withdrawal of troops: fear of migration of terror to America. The fear of transfer of Iraq-based terror to the US is unfounded. America does not provide nesting grounds for terror. Terrorists have no demographic cover in the US. To survive terrorists require an environment that tolerates underground organization. Arab and Muslim Americans are educated, integrated and loyal citizens. Terrorism thrives within communities that are alienated from larger society with no stakes in the economic and social system. In fact, Arabs and Muslims of America are the best agents for fighting terrorism because they are loyal Americans and they stand to lose the most by acts of terror, regardless of where these acts occurs in the world.

And finally, the most important element underpinning the mindset of staying the course in Iraq is fear of spread of civil war when troops are withdrawn. If the US troops leave the country as defeated occupiers hostilities will indeed expand within and outside Iraq. But US could leave honorably by engaging in an alternative strategy. That strategy would integrate regional peace with empowerment and political reconciliation. The US still garners respect in many quarters of the Middle East. America has regional allies that are willing to cooperate to solve the Iraq conundrum. Four of the countries that border Iraq are friendly to the US - Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But Iran and Syria are in a conflict with America. However, these two adversarial regimes have shown in the past strong willingness to reconcile with the US if their interests are considered seriously. Syria and Iran have assertive and volatile regimes. But the US cannot afford to ignore two of the six countries that encircle Iraq if it wishes to establish a comprehensive consortium of peace in the region.

A three-way regional peace forged among the US, the Iraqi government and the six border countries- Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan and Kuwait- would go a long way in resolving the conflict. But a regional peace agreement with the US requires painful processing of reality and a seismic shift in foreign policy.

Establishing a regional peace would unify the region against world terrorism. The most practical cure for international terrorism can naturally emerge from within the power structure of the Muslim world. AlQaeda will be defeated in Iraq and in Afghanistan when Iran, Turkey and the Arab world cooperate wholeheartedly with the West to eliminate terrorism.

When Middle East powers agree on a US sponsored plan for a reunified Iraq, a regional peace-force can be organized with a negotiable long-term mandate. This regional peace force would prevent the threat of continued civil war and the spread of the conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.

The question for America is not whether to withdraw or to stay; the question is whether to work with regional partners or to bully them into compliance.

A new US foreign policy would free Americans from a triumphal military stance, a simplistic geographical approach to control terrorism and a single-handed uphill strategy to conflict resolution.

A Smart Arab Invetsment

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida - The hope for social and industrial awakening in the Middle East and North Africa may start in unexpected ways. The most potent indicator of social change is women's education.

Nine years of schooling for every woman would wipe out a large segment of poverty. It would also significantly reduce children's school dropout rates and immeasurably enhance the economic well-being of society. Moreover, if every young Arab child has two to four years of pre-schooling, overall educational achievement will jump considerably.

Is this too much to dream of?

Early childhood development (ECD) programmes are a well-kept secret in the Arab world and are making their way toward effective change. ECD is a psycho-social programme of early care and stimulation for children, which is integrated with training activities of empowerment for mothers whose young children are also enrolled.

I was "educated" about the magic quality of ECD in the West Bank and Gaza. I learned that women who were shy, overburdened, submissive and lacking in skills, could, with the help of ECD programmes, read and write, prepare for jobs and look their husbands in the eye with pride. In short, they learned to become active citizens.

The focus in ECD is more on emotional and social learning than on schooling. The agency running ECD is oftentimes not a school but a community-based social organisation that works closely with the family in poor rural or urban neighbourhoods.

Forty-six percent of Arab women do not read or write. Jordan has almost 100 percent literacy, while Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Gaza and Morocco have the highest levels of illiteracy. In as many as seven Arab countries, more than 20 percent of children under the age of five are stunted due to malnutrition. These findings make a strong case for introducing aggressive remedial programmes to empower Arab women and to stimulate the development of their children.

Literacy programmes are slowly spreading in many countries of the region. But it will take 40 years to conquer illiteracy at the current rate of intervention. Early childhood programmes that serve mothers and their young children make a corrective impact on illiteracy.

Typically, an Arab child starts school at the age of six. Young children born to families living in under-served communities are exposed to health and developmental problems that affect their future in big ways. Developmental delays in emotional, physical, social or intellectual growth are often irreversible when they occur in early childhood.

Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian territories have had some experience with ECD programmes. Jordan has invested in nationwide activities over the last few years in creative pre-school programmes. Quality ECD programmes involve mothers, have trained teachers and are community based. The results have been rewarding in enhancing school performance in later years showing that early education saves spending on programmes for disability.

Lebanon has probably the longest record of pre-school programmes in the region. Thousands of Arab women leaders who have graduated from the Lebanese American University (LAU) over many generations were empowered through ECD education. LAU (earlier known as Beirut College for Women) trained pre-school teachers for several decades. In the Arab world as a whole, however, the degree of commitment to ECD as a programme of social intervention that emphasises work with mothers unfortunately remains weak.

In the Arab world, ECD is not only suitable for the poor. Early childhood programmes can also benefit affluent Arab countries. The young children of oil-rich Arab countries do not suffer from hunger and disease, but they encounter different challenges: rapid social change and over-dependence on expatriate labour in childcare. In such countries, parents can be pre-occupied by business or passive leisure. Parents tend to leave childcare to expatriate nannies and caregivers. Children who are raised by low-paid, uneducated – and often labour rights-deprived guest workers – are not likely to bond with their natural parents and may suffer developmental delays.

In several Gulf countries the native population is a demographic minority and expatriates constitute the majority. In such a unique demographic setting, ECD may be a good programme for children who are destined to face increasing challenges of social change in adult life.

Graduates of early childhood programmes do better in school and are better adjusted in society, more likely to be employed and less likely to go to jail. Moreover, a World Bank report on Jordan shows that ECD programmes have contributed significantly to the national economy. There is consistent evidence that public spending for programmes of early childhood development is smart social investment. For every dollar a government spends on early childhood development, society receives plenty in return.

It is hoped that in the active search for ways to eradicate poverty and limit social instability, Arab social planners will soon consider ECD one tool among others that can make a difference for the future.

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* Ghassan Michel Rubeiz is the former secretary of the World Council of Churches for the Middle East, former director of the Washington office of the Christian Children's Fund and a former member of the ECD International Consultancy Group. This article was written for the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.

How long can we afford to stay in Iraq?

Palm Beach Gardens, March 12, 2008.

As the dollar value falls, the stock market declines, the housing crisis deepens, the national deficit skyrockets and entitlement reserves (for Social Security and Medicare) erode, and as the economic and social security of the nation worsens on every front, how long can we afford to stay in Iraq?

It is true that last year’s increase in American troops has allowed soldiers to establish zones of security in previously explosive Baghdad neighborhoods and the Iraqi army has gradually gained some skill and confidence in defending the country against suicidal insurgents. While the US troop surge in Iraq has reduced American fatalities significantly, it has not significantly reduced the danger to Iraqis. Casualty rates among Iraqis remain high and quality of life continues to be worse than it was before the war.

The political situation in Iraq remains gloomy. Iraqi leaders are not reconciled; the country is divided; ethnic cleansing does not stop and a national political vision is absent.

Few observers have analyzed the causal connection between the surge and security in Iraq. Measuring the specific impact of the surge on the war is complicated. Many analysts attribute the improvement in security, in part, to the self imposed withdrawal of Muqtada Sadr and his powerful Mehdi militia from armed conflict with US forces and with Sunni factions. Moreover, troop increase has been accompanied by massive infusion of money into the pockets of local Sunni militias in recent months. Contractually, the army pays 80,000 Iraqi insurgents 300 US dollars a person per month to join the national security forces.

In this deal we do not know how much money is also being secretly funneled to militia and tribal leaders. We do not know what would happen to security if this military bankrolling were to be withdrawn. Are the alleged results of the surge a function of military perseverance and troop dedication to cause or an artifact of bribery of a nation that is starving?

It is not clear who first conceived of the idea that the US war in Iraq could be won with more US boots on the ground. Some Republicans are counting on the surge to save America from its current dismal failure in Iraq. Twice as many Republicans as Democrats see progress as a result of troop increase. John McCain, the Republican presidential nominee, claims intellectual ownership of the surge in order to promote his campaign. The Arizona senator argues that America is not ready to leave Iraq in the near future; the surge is merely the initial step in the long march toward victory. McCain’s chances for winning the White House are closely tied to the future course of stability in Iraq.

Determination to succeed is admirable, but has it never occurred to the Vietnam-veteran senator that America has already achieved “success” of some sort in Iraq? American forces in 2003 succeeded to knock off Saddam Hussein, to disband the army and to remove the Baath party from power. But since those initial achievements continued war has come at a high collateral cost.

The occupation has demolished the socio-economic infrastructure, displaced about ten percent of the population, allowed massive ethnic cleansing and tolerated the split of the country into three ethno-sectarian zones. Moreover, the US occupation has had the counterproductive effect of mobilizing terrorists worldwide to join forces with local Iraqi insurgents in fighting unwelcome US presence on Arab and Islamic soil.

The military surge was adopted as a last resort to attempt to reverse the downward spiral in Iraq. Instead of assuming responsibility for the tragic failure of US policy in Iraq, the Bush administration had chosen to allow political and economic conditions to reach catastrophic proportions.

Can a foreign and distrusted military establish security in Iraq and facilitate political reform? Iraq’s political problems can never be solved militarily. As long as Iraq’s neighboring countries are frustrated with US Middle East policy, and as long these regimes feel marginalized, the US will face insurmountable difficulties in stabilizing Iraq.

Even if the surge policy ultimately succeeds in improving security how long can the US economy sustain the cost of the Iraq war? The occupation has already cost the US one trillion dollars, and according to Joseph Stiglitz, a reputable Nobel laureate economist, Iraq expenses are expected to reach three trillion by 2017, in contrast to much lower government estimates.

The current cost of the Iraq war is 12 billion dollars a month. With a monthly twelve billion dollar budget we can provide medical insurance to millions of Americans, protect the national border, reduce teen age pregnancy, divert youth from jail, place more students in college, restore economic security to neglected neighborhoods, improve the quality of education and employ many people who are out of jobs.

In defining national security within a paradigm of force, the US is generating insecurity in its homeland and in the rest of the world. The surge is a symptom of a desperate and short-sighted foreign policy.

Contact author through email: Grubeiz@comcast.net

On the Middle East Obama remains committed

Palm Beach Gardens, Florida

In the presidential debate of late February, at a very competitive stage, Obama did not assure Arab-Americans or Muslims of his special regard for their concerns. Some Arabs interpreted Obama’s unconditional support of Israel in this forum as a subtle betrayal of Arab and Muslim sentiments.

However, others in the Arab-American community do understand the circumstances for Obama’s appeasement of the Jewish community. Now that he is near the Democratic front-runner status he feels that he must be careful not to jeopardize his candidacy. Attempts to handicap him in reputation, ideology, background, qualification, racial identity, faith, and unsavory affiliation, which have come from limitless sources, are indeed taxing his presidential campaign.

Obama expects Arab-Americans not to look at him through a narrow, Middle East lens. The senator expects them to appreciate the fact that any US president needs to be a close partner to Israel in order to succeed in enabling a just-peace for the region.

The presumptive Democratic nominee has chosen a tough ideological path to follow in his national campaign. His views on abortion, health care, poverty, immigration, taxes, Iraq (troop withdrawal), Iran (open for dialogue) and Palestine (viable statehood) promise formidable policy changes.

Arab-Americans who brush aside the challenges in these ideological fronts tend to judge his candidacy by his stance on Iraq, Palestine and Islam. From an Arab perspective, Obama’s Iraq policy is sound. However, his Israel-Palestine policies are balanced in his writings but not always in his campaign speeches. And on Islam, the senator from Illinois appears sometimes too defensive.

While Clinton is too eager to please Israel, Obama often walks a tightrope to satisfy both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide. In a close national presidential race the Middle East dynamics may affect the election results. On Israel-Palestine, the Democrats are divided but most Republicans unconditionally support the Jewish state.

In the February debate, Obama’s moderate pro-Jewish credentials and his connection with Islam were scrutinized. His response assured the Jewish community, and the wider American circle of Israel supporters, that an Obama presidency would not change the privileged position of Israel. He proudly stated that he is close to Israel, that he receives inspiration and support from the Jewish constituency and that he plans to strengthen the ties between the African-American and the Jewish communities.

There is another side to Obama’s complex message. The candidate has popularized the refreshing slogan “yes we can.” He certainly reflected his positive can-do outlook in addressing the Cleveland Jewish community on February 24, 2008:

“I will strengthen Israel's security and strengthen Palestinian partners who support that vision and personally work for two states that can live side-by-side in peace and security with Israel's status as a Jewish state ensured so that Israelis and Palestinians can pursue their dreams.” He added that the Palestinian state has to be sustainable. “It’s going to have to be contiguous; it’s going to have to work. It’s going to have to function in some way. This is in Israel’s interest, by the way. If you have a balkanized unsustainable state, it will break down and we will be back in the same boat.”

In the Cleveland speech the Illinois senator expressed more can-do policy: “This is where I get to be honest and I hope I am not out of school here. I think there is a strain within the pro-Israeli community that says unless you adopt an unwavering pro-Likud approach to Israel that you’re anti-Israel and that can’t be the measure of our friendship with Israel.”

In seeking justice for the Holy Land Obama has to sensitively challenge the confining American pro-Israeli perspective. He needs to convince the voters that America’s compassion for the Jewish people does not negate compassion for the Palestinians; that strengthening the Judeo-Christian bond does not have to alienate Muslims; that assuring lasting security for Israel does not lessen the viability of a Palestinian state; that re-activating the peace process does not undermine long-term Israeli security; that listening to Arab-Americans does not signal a distancing from Israel.

But still Arab-Americans yearn for more political courage from Obama, the candidate of “change.” Many Muslims who tend to identify with Barack feel hurt that he seems to be more eager to protect his image as a devout Christian than to promote the message that Islam is an honorable religion that is being treated in the media as a social problem.

Obama has been attacked by racists and religious bigots on his background association with Islam. In the February debate, when asked if he has any special ties with Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam, he denounced its leader whose anti-Semitism is known. Strangely, no party in the debate exchange took the opportunity to clarify that Islam, as a religion, has no theological connection with the Nation of Islam cult. Obama has to stop distancing himself from Islam and to confront the bigoted smear on his candidacy. Obama can treat his cultural proximity to Islam as strength and as an inspiring message.

Personal ambition and political insecurity impact Obama’s courage and political innovation. To expect him to be daring while he is not politically secure maybe unrealistic. In the next electoral phase, if Obama is chosen to be the Democratic nominee, he should become confident enough to tackle international and Middle East policies with sufficient courage.