Negotiate with Iran to end the Syrian crises and regional instability

 

East Meredith, New York

September 9, 2013

 

Air strike diplomacy is not prudent.  War could be averted if Washington would negotiate with Tehran to resolve Syria’s crisis.

In the current New York Times Book Review of Kenneth Pollack’s book Bomb Scare:  ‘unthinkable’, Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, advocates negotiating a grand bargain with Iran to settle all mutual concerns. He sensibly says: Only a truly bold approach, it would seem, has a chance of avoiding the march to war. Everything has to be put on the table: Iranian security and America’s, the nuclear program, sanctions, terrorism, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/books/review/unthinkable-by-kenneth-m-pollack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

In a week or two the US military may strike Syria for regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons.  It is hard to tell if President Obama would go to war ignoring public as well as congressional opposition to the planned intervention.

Obama’s plan is intended to degrade Syria’s military.  But there is not yet a firm, direct link between President Assad and the crime of using chemical weapons on his people. We go to war by “common sense”, the White House explains.

Obama is on a risky adventure. The strike might provoke new hostilities in the region, cost more innocent lives and deepen the fragmentation of Syria. The attack might work against the interests of the US. It would cost billions of dollars at a time when Washington is shrinking spending on vital domestic programs.

New thinking in foreign policy is badly needed. A less punitive US approach to Iran may open new possibilities for negotiations on both the Syrian and nuclear conflicts. There is a shelved International peace conference for Syria the US and Russia already agreed to last spring, Geneva 2. Geneva 2 was frozen for one main reason: disagreement over Assad’s future. Washington wanted Assad out of the picture, whereas Russia wanted him to stay in power.

The purpose of Geneva 2 was to end the fighting immediately, form a transition government representing the regime and the opposition and set a political reform plan in motion.

The US must now shift from negotiating with Russia alone to include Iran.  But this shift is hard when the US considers Iran an obstacle rather than a potential asset, as Leslie Gelb argues. Obama threatens to punish Syria with the intent “to send a strong message to Iran”.

Washington could work with Hassan Rouhani, the newly elected President of Iran who has been issuing signals of moderation. For the new Iranian leader could effectively lean on Assad to negotiate peace on new, realistic terms.

Realistically, the continuity of Assad in a new Syria is unthinkable today. If Assad would now promise not to run in the 2014 elections it would be a symbolic but significant concession.  Assad’s departure from Syria in six to twelve months would allow moderate and indigenous Syrian opposition groups to join regime reformists in forming a political transition government. During the period of political transition, Assad could share leadership with a vice president from the opposition.

Why would Assad consider not running for presidential elections in May 2014?

The threat might work. Deep down, Assad knows that the strike might succeed in degrading his military and possibly lead to his deposition.

Iran is key in Syria. If Rouhani were to pressure Assad to end a fourteen-year rule, following his father’s 30-year old regime, Assad junior may concede to his closest and most generous partner.  Assad would secure a safe exit. He would insure that Syria’s minorities would be protected.

The reformist regime elements would stay. Assad’s continuity would be partially realized through power sharing. In building a new Syria, the opposition will introduce reforms and the regime will defend secularism and protection of minorities.

Hitting two birds with one stone makes sense. Resolving Syria’s crisis would help in negotiations on the Iranian nuclear crisis. The link would be face saving for Assad.

Washington’s current policy of strike now and negotiate better terms later, after balance of power shifts against Assad, runs the risk of future inability to restrain the radical elements of the opposition.

Calibrating power through air strikes is sloppy diplomacy; if intervention does not achieve its intended objectives, a dictator becomes a hero or a martyr.