Political developments activates Mideast peace process

 

East Meredith, NY

 

The Palestinians have been urging for peace talks for years.  Surprisingly, a new round of negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis starts this week in Washington DC. What has brought Israel’s hard line Prime Minister Netanyahu to the peace table?

Possibly four recent political developments have softened the current Israeli cabinet to negotiate the future of the occupation of Arab land.

The European Union (EU) boycotts Israeli settlements. EU designates the military branch of Hezbollah a terror group. Egypt restricts the economic activities of Hamas in Gaza. And fourthly, President Rouhani assumes power in Iran on August first.

First, the EU boycott. When 28 European states announce a policy of economic sanctions on products manufactured by Israeli settlers, the message is clear: the EU considers the Israeli occupation illegitimate. In barring Israeli imports, partnerships and other forms of business from the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the EU is effectively enforcing a policy of rejection of the 1967 occupation; the EU is declaring the Israeli occupation a violation of international law.  

The boycott has exposed two rarely discussed United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Over four decades ago these resolutions stipulated that Israel should withdraw from the Occupied Territories in the context of a regional peace settlement.     

For Israelis, the EU boycott evokes fear of association of their occupation with the sobering 1980’s transformation of South Africa. The stigma of the Israeli occupation is neither new nor hidden, for Israel’s strong critics have in the past labeled the Zionist occupation “apartheid”.

After the US, Europe is the second most important friend and partner of Israel. Israel got the boycott message: if EU sanctions gain acceptance internationally, the cycle of diplomatic isolation of the Jewish state could escalate. US public opinion would no longer be an exception. President Obama, Secretary of State Kerry, Secretary of Defense Hagel and Chairman of Chiefs of Staff (General) Dempsey have all already warned Israel that the occupation is bound to “hurt” and “isolate” the occupier. The EU boycott has suddenly given Israel a pause.

And within the American Jewish community the sentiment for peace is growing. In Israel itself, peace activists and national security leaders have diagnosed the occupation “non-sustainable”. Should the peace talks fail, the EU boycott is likely to gain unlimited momentum.

The second relevant event comes from a contrasting diplomatic act. By classifying the army of Hezbollah as a terror group, the EU could have contributed indirectly to the activation of the peace talks. Hezbollah is currently Tel Aviv’s most threatening adversary. Syria’s ongoing no-end-in-sight, civil war may be Hezbollah’s Vietnam. Following the Lebanese Resistance’s recent deployment in Syria - to try to rescue the Alawite-affiliated regime in Damascus - Tel Aviv may anticipate Syria to become eventually a political incinerator for the Resistance.  Hezbollah’s military diversion from Israel to Syria may have given Netanyahu’s cabinet some security. The EU’s designation of Hezbollah’s military side a terrorist organization may have added to Israel’s confidence, helping a reluctant government (in denial of occupation) to come to the peace table.

The third ingredient to encourage Israel to talk peace may have come from an unexpected development in Egypt. The post- Morsi regime seems to be keen on limiting the power of the Islamic Resistance (Hamas), which has ruled Gaza and functioned as an armed source of challenge to Israel’s security. For reasons of its own, the new government in Cairo has in recent days closed the majority of secret tunnels which link Gaza with Egypt. Today, like Hezbollah, Hamas is weak: abandoned by a troubled Syrian regime and an insecure Egyptian government. With Hamas and Hezbollah, not to mention Syria and Egypt, facing serious obstacles, Israel has never been safer militarily. By accepting to negotiate some level of withdrawal from the 1967 borders, the Jewish state may be seizing a moment of military superiority, ironically paralleled by diplomatic isolation, to offer some level of concessions, yet to be judged. Will the concessions be historic and strategic or tactical and insignificant?

There is a fourth factor: Iran remains a top priority for Israel. The new moderate Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, assumes power in August. Israel wishes to face what it considers a nearly nuclear-ready Iran with maximal diplomatic strength. By going to the Palestinian peace table, Israel partially frees itself, at least momentarily, from the moral burden of being an occupier-in-denial. By being, or appearing to be, totally committed to the Western perspective of diplomacy, Israel feels it could better influence the next critical round of nuclear negotiations with Iran.

The new round of talks resumes due to important changes in the political landscape of the region. If the coming round fails it may be the end of the peace process.  Fear of failure could turn out to be the most hopeful ingredient in shaping future Mideast political compromise.