Prospects of democracy in Iraq

Prospects For Democracy In Iraq

Lecture at Arlington Unitarian Church, May 6, 2003

Bernard Lewis asks: “What Went Wrong?” in his recent popular book explaining why modern Arabs are afraid of social change. Fareed Zakaria, in a post 9/11 Newsweek article, asked the question: “Why do they hate us?” Neither Arabs nor Americans have good answers to these two questions. This is why I worry about the chances of democracy in Iraq.
The question of how long the US should stay in Iraq is being debated with passion. One side argues for a long stay that to insure stability in a country that has lost the iron fist that kept it unified. The opposite side argues for a short US stay to allow the UN to take over from the US in Iraq’s political reconstruction. I happen to favor the latter perspective, a short and light US political presence but with extended humanitarian support.
The first part of this presentation deals with central issues of the intervention process: Iraqi state unity, stability, leadership and social barriers. The second part deals with democracy building from a technical angle: the electoral process, state institutions and civic society. The third part addresses the common interests of Arabs and Americans.


Part One: Social Process of Rebuilding Political Iraq

The United States’ proclaimed goal in the war on Iraq was to eliminate Saddam and liberate Iraq. Iraqis now are worried that the war might eliminate Iraq and liberate Saddam, figuratively. While Iraqis are worried about Iraq’s unity and integrity in the aftermath of war, they would also like to see the Saddam cult eliminated, not only from ruling, but also from their political environment. Iraq could easily split into three political fragments. Saddam may be killed, but his strategy of oppression, silencing of intellectuals and exploiting religious symbols can easily survive and multiply in the region. America’s heavy handed foreign policy could foster conflict and add suffering in the region, even unintentionally, if Middle East’s problems are not handled with cultural sensitivity. Iraqis are expressing the view echoed diplomatically by the futurist Paul Kennedy in his Washington Post article on April 20. In “The Perils of An Empire” he cautioned the US not to stay too long in Iraq and to be gentle in its presence. He says: “If it took the minimalist approach, the United States might just do its best to quell local disorders and feuding, encourage a multi party political process, assist in relief aid and swiftly retire from the scene, handing things over to the locals plus U.N. agencies. But the hawkish intellectuals and policy makers inside the Beltway believe that America should take this opportunity to transform the Middle East” (Washington Post, Outlook, B3). The US is now at an intersection in the Middle East, one road leads to problem solving and the other to further suffering. Dr. Michael Hudson amusingly observes: the US plan in Iraq is the most expensive political science experiment in the world. (April 28, Panel, Dirksen Senate bldg, SD 569)


1. Integrity of Iraq and Its Unity

The first concern in establishing the new regime in Iraq is unity of the country. The US is officially reconstructing Iraq as a unit. But the fact is that the US has treated the country almost as separate entities in its close military alliance with Kurds and the ten year “no fly” zone. The US war campaign also contributed to the problem of Iraqi disunity and Arab American cultural divide. The US media spoke at length of the sectarian and ethnic tension in Iraq and portrayed Islam as a religion of conflict.
The US plan, we hear, is to create a federation in three regions of the country: The Kurds in the northeast, the Sunnis in the center and the Shiites in the South. This plan was announced before any political consultation and long before the war had started. We began to hear from informal sources (who are close to the US Administration) that if Iraqis do not agree to unite, the US cannot guarantee the federation.
The US will be judged on how seriously it will act to support the unity of Iraq. There are very few federations that work well in third world countries. In Europe, inIn Switzerland, where federal unity is an example of good policy, economic prosperity is widespread among the Germans, the Italians and the French speaking Swiss. Birth rates across the three ethnic groups are low; secularism dominates the culture. These are conditions that are not prevalent in Iraq. In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Adeed Dawisha recommends a federal system of 18 existing provinces, rather than three ethnically based regions, to encourage cross ethnic and sectarian alliance among politicians. A Kurdish/ Sunni/ Shiite federal system might be vulnerable to future ethnic cleansing. (May/June 2003, p. 39)
Strong societal bonding measures (e.g. security, a vibrant economy and strong leadership) are required to maintain unity of the envisioned IraqThe best tool to maintain unity in a country is the rule of law. When people are protected under the law, when opportunity is accessible to all, regardless of social background, unity prevails. To treat unity as a pure matter of political will of the people is risky. Unity strengthens when the diverse communities have a basis of shared interests, culture, history, leadership and language. The Iraqis are a nation sharing a common language (with minority languages), vast resources, deep history and political interests for the future. Islam is the central faith of the country. It is not well known that many Sunnis and Shiites are integrated through intermarriage. Often, it is politicians who divide religious communities into Shiites and Sunnites. The small Christian minority in Iraq has generally been respected in Iraq.
Conclusion? Unity of Iraq is not to be treated as a “pending” factor, or a secondary issue; restoring unity to Iraq is essential and has a regional message. There is a wide spread suspicion in the region that the US has a divisive plan for the Arab world. A long military and political presence would reinforce this suspicion.


2. Stability and Order

The Iraqis are exhausted, and they will give the US army the benefit of the doubt by cooperating. The US army is less threatening to the Iraqis than the symbols of conquest.. Major US television channels are soon expected to beam daily their programs to Iraq from Iraqi skies to “teach Iraqis by example”. Fox channel and the 700 Club television station are expected to lead the nation in sending messages of cultural and religious salvation for Iraqis.
Putting the political reconstruction in the hands of a US general sends a message of “occupation”. Iraqis are trying to figure out who is General Jay Garner, Chief of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. Many in the region see him as a man of bias.
In observing US policy in the region over several decades I am fascinated at the level of US myopia when it comes to choosing mediators of stability, peace and foreign policy in the region.

Al Jazira TV has made White House foreign policy a domestic issue in the Middle East. Most Arabs feel that Israel has a strong hand in US foreign policy of this administration. Uri Avneri, an Israeli journalist, speaks to this point. This is what he claims, on April 10, in an article titled, “The Night After”: “After the end of hostilities in Iraq, the world will be faced with two decisive facts- First, the immense superiority of American arms can beat any people in the world, valiant as it may be. Second, the small group that initiated this war- an alliance of Christian fundamentalists and Jewish neo –conservatives- has won big, and from now on it will control Washington almost without limits.” I hope that Avneri is wrong.
Messages are critical in attitude change. The Iraqi people are yearning to see external credible leadership in the system of reconstruction. Foreign occupation is hard for the Iraqis to accept. They are being asked to face massive, human, physical and cultural devastation and to learn democracy. The lack of protection for the Baghdad museum has sent a powerful message to the Iraqis about the cultural sensitivity of the US war machinery. Historians will have something to say about this cultural massacre.

3. Leadership

Iraqis do not have political leaders of great promise now. The process of choosing leadership is critical to political rebuilding. The process of hand picking leaders and representatives for Iraq by the US is not hard to observe. Ahmed Chalabi is a good example of US interference in the choice process.
The record of the US government in supporting local Arab leaders is not good. The quality of the interim government will be related to the process of selection of community leaders from the diverse communities. Will the US invite all political shades for representation? Will Islamists, Ba’thist, communists and Assyrian fundamentalists be invited to represent Iraqis?
The major challenge lies in the Shiite community, the largest and the most alienated from the US. Iraq Shiite alienation from the US is not easy to deal with. They are aware of the inconsistent foreign policy record of the US in Iraq; many identify with Iran; many consider the US forces an invading empire and a crusader. However, Iraqi Shiites are still patriotic and they are not likely to fall easily for a divisive scenario of organizing for an independent Shiite state. But the US can drive them into this scenario,
unintentionally. Shiites will come to the table of power sharing in Iraq when they are respected and allowed a major voice.
If the people of Iraq are allowed to choose their leader they may chose someone who is not favored by the US. Is the US ready to face a surprise- a leader who may not go along with its aspirations? Do not expect a hero to emerge from the ranks of the Western-oriented Iraqis, given the state of Iraq society today. Perhaps a full generation of successive leaders will need to be elected democratically before a Western oriented leader is chosen.
Is the US ready to allow democracy to unfold through several layers of purification toward the ideal? Is the US ready to allow the Iraqis to define what is ideal for them politically at every stage? On this subject Fareed ZachariaZakaria, the Newsweek editor, argues that we cannot afford to wait too long for democracy to develop Islamic style. (See his latest book, The Future of Freedom). Zacharia Zakaria argues that the US should support government reform to insure a basis of “constitutional liberalism” before facing unpredictable consequences of popular and free elections. Democratic elections can lead to disasters, if the majority is not sensitive to minorities, he asserts. But Caryle Murphy in her book, Passion for Islam, makes the contrasting point that Muslims should be trusted to develop their own form of democracy; the West should not orchestrate the change.
Some Social

Some Social Barriers to Democracy

Democracy planners will face a number of social barriers in Iraq society. America’s military presence on Iraqi soil may be reassuring for minorities, but it is very threatening to the majority of Iraqis. The US is associated with colonialism and unjust “occupation of territories” in the region. Also, Iraqis distrust government authority. Tribal identity is very strong. Saddam exploited this reality and reinforced it. So did the British during the Iraqi years of the mandate, after the collapse of the Ottoman rule and the establishment of the Monarchy in 1921. More importantly, family and kin ties are the strongest elements of loyalty in the life of the citizen. Family ties are even stronger than tribal ties. Loyalty to the state will grow slowly with security, economic stability and freedoms of expression, organization, worship and movement.
Democracy is a distant next after stability and satisfaction of basic human needs Sectarian feelings among the three communities, the Kurds Sunnis and Shiites, are serious, but not as strong as portrayed in the US media. Kurds are the most secular among the three groups for a variety of reasons. Arab and Turkish repression of Kurdish communities have somewhat elevated the ethnic identity of the Kurds at the expense of their religious (Muslim) consciousness. Kurds and Sunni leaders in Iraq tend to be secular. If there was any positive side effect in Saddam rule, it was
his secular orientation. But he used religious symbols to manipulate people inside and outside the country. One additional point: teamwork in Iraq is hard to come by, as is the case in the entire Arab world. There are unlimited implications of this simple fact on Iraqi political behavior.

Part Two: Democracy Framework

The US Record in Democracy Building

The US record of aiding democracy overseas is mixed with good and bad stories, asserts Thomas Carothers in his well-researched book, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The US is learning how to build democracy; there is a learning curve, he contends. However, his conclusion is that when security and other national US interests clash with local interests we know that the US interests would dominate. We learn from Carother’s research that the Middle East has never been a fertile ground for democracy building. Carothers recommends increased attention to culturally indigenous mechanisms of power sharing especially in tribal cultures. He cautions us against expecting too much of democracy building programs. He expresses this sobering conclusion powerfully: “On the whole, democracy programs are at best a secondary influence because they do not have a decisive effect on the underlying conditions of the society that largely determine a country’s political trajectory- the character and alignment of the main political forces; the degree of concentration of economic power; the levels of education, wealth, and social mobility; the political traditions, expectations, and values of the citizenry; and the presence and absence of powerful antidemocratic elements”( 341).

Three Stages
To examine the readiness of Iraq for democracy today, it helps to look at the concept. To make us appreciate the complexity of democracy, Thomas Carothers categorized it conceptually in a template, which is composed of three sectors. These sectors and their specific dimensions will be briefly examined as they apply to Iraq.
1. Free electoral process
2. Mature and independent state institutions
3. Active civil society.

1. Electoral Process
Carothers’s scheme implies that to build the electoral process one needs to help the Iraqi people run fair and free elections and organize competing and strong national political parties. For over thirty years, Iraqis have lived with “hundred percent” election results and they have gotten used to it. They have also tolerated a one party system with phenomenal submission. Despite its lofty ideals (Arab unity and egalitarian social policy) the Ba’th party is perhaps the worst political Arab organization. In fact now, most Arab political parties are in disarray, and what remains of the party system is little beyond rhetoric. The exception to this rule is the Islamist Parties, which have exploited the mosque as a safe haven environment for political organization. Islamist parties have also integrated religious ideology with social service and galvanized the poor segments of society against the ruling elites, against Israel and the West. Militarily, the Islamists are the elements of resistance with a durable stamina. Secular parties have lost much of their credit among the populace because they have drummed up war and brought disasters in 1948, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 1991. Elections and party systems have to be rebuilt, but the rush for elections and party organization should be secondary to building stability, good governance and freedom during the first phase of political reconstruction.

2. State Institutions have five dimensions:
a. Democratic constitution
b. Modern court system
c. Effective Legislative body
d. Responsive government
e. Military under the rule of law

Since the days of the Monarchy, a respectable constitution has existed in Iraq, but it is not enforced. The judges were submissive to the Saddam regime. The law was in the hands of Saddam and his two notorious and pathological sons. Corruption in Iraq reached phenomenal levels in recent years. Iraqis must be exhausted by war. If the Alliedinternational forces agencies take advantagewould support of speedy and efficient cleansing of basic government services they will gain momentum for later building of sophisticated democratic structures. The temptation is to rely too heavily on foreign hands in the rebuilding process. The policy of excessive reliance on international experts in democracy aid is common. I have seen it Eastern Europe and the results are rarely rewarding. Arab experts in rule of law, governance and civic society should take priority over Western experts who do not know the local culture. I have observed that many Washington based agencies are sending experts to Iraq who do not speak the language or know the culture; they are relying too much on previous experience in Afghanistan, although Afghanistan and Iraq do not have much in common, societally.

3. Civil society has four dimensions:
a. Voluntary associations challenging the political system and
mobilizing society for desirable goals
b. Politically educated citizenry
c. Free and diverse media
d. Strong Unions

Iraqi civil society has been virtually reduced to charity, generating very low level of advocacy for the marginalized segment of society. The media sings to the tune of government. The unions are totally tamed. University professors quickly learn to stop asking intelligent political questions. Iraq is rich in political heritage, but in recent decades people have withdrawn from politics to survive. The Iraqi Diaspora is relatively sophisticated, but the people are divided and leadership is weak. The media and unions are to be built from almost nothing. However, the potential for Iraq to recover in rebuilding civil life is good, given enough time and adequate support.
In summary, democracy work in the above three sectors will take many years. This work will have to be done with Iraqi and Arab human resources in the lead. The international community and the United Nations must assume the empowering role, but the American tendency to lead and to do things fast is of major concern.


Part Three: Americans and Arabs with Common Interests

US interests in the region do not have to be in conflict with the interests of the Arabs. But they are now. To achieve political goals the Arabs and Americans must find a language of common interest. The current language is one of opposition and of parallel communication. There is a chance in this widening crisis to settle large issues of which the Iraq regime is a mere symptom. A new Iraqi regime will not change the situation in the Arab World (or even in Iraq in the long run) if there is no basic changes in the ways Arabs conduct their affairs and in the ways American behave on the international scene.
Arabs must acknowledge the need for drastic reform in the practice of the rule of law. Americans much push for this change uniformly. No doubt, Palestine lost land is a political crime committed by Israel, the West and by Arab states against Palestinians. But Arabs must stop using the Palestinian question as a wailing wall. While Israeli occupation is a central problem, it is not the center of all Arab problems. The root cause of Arab malaise is not lost land, but a life style of tranquility in misery. The root cause of Arab problems is political silence, which replaces voice; rhetoric, which replaces action; religious dogma, which dilutes faith; denial, which limits social awareness; tyranny, which characterize leadership.

Americans must acknowledge that they have hindered Arab reforms by establishing symbiotic relations with the most regressive Arab regimes. Earlier, the US extended the life of Saddam’s regime significantly by selling him arms and taking him as a covert ally. Earlier, the US had even encouraged Muslim fundamentalism when it was suitable to do so. Both Arab rulers and American foreign policy makers have had too long a common interest in delaying an Arab awakening for fear of what will happen to US interests. While Arabs must acknowledge that “freedom, knowledge and gender deficit” (expression borrowed from UNDP Report 2000) is their basic problem, Americans must allow Arabs to experiment with their own form of democracy building. While Arabs have to start allowing true Islam to flourish outside politics, Christians in America must reciprocate with ecumenism.
Preceding the Iraq war, there had been a silent religious ideological war between Christian and Muslim fundamentalists. In the Arab world, there is a widely publicized cruel violence that is expressed in suicidal terrorism. Arabs are foolish not to condemn it universally and organize politically to stop it. Less noticeable and hardly restrained in America, is a growing movement of theological violence. The Christian fundamentalists are planning for the rest of the world to go to hell while they prepare for heaven. They portray Muslims as demons. They have a disproportionate share in the foreign policy of this government. With such allies who speak of demons and Armageddon theories of history and politics, how can the current US administration win the hearts and minds of the Arabs? Equally, with such uniform abuse of rule of law how can Arabs claim to be serious in their search for political and social solutions to their predicament?
Extreme cultural sensitivity, especially in the domain of religion and Israel, would help the process of democracy in Iraq. It is hard to believe that some agencies are planning to distribute Bibles as part of their menu of relief. The conservative Evangelical media messages about Islam have already made the mission of aid workers doubly difficult in the Arab world today. Regardless of how external aid workers feel about Middle East issues, most Arabs are too angry (about US foreign policy and double standards) to dialogue freely about Israel with Westerners nowadays. On the Arab street, this war is partially viewed as an Israeli-American war on an Arab state.

Regional issues: Pandora’s Box
The Middle East region’s problems are interconnected and they certainly affect Iraq. The US intends to deal with these regional problems directly and from a close range. The occupying coalition in Iraq monitors Iraq, as well as the rest of the Arab world, and Iran. The reason is clear- connectedness. The problem of Iraq is tied to Palestine; Israeli occupation is seen in the region as the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Palestine is tied to Syria; Israel occupies The Golan. Syria is connected with Lebanon; its forces are in Lebanon. Lebanon is connected with Iran; Iran supports and directs Hezbollah. The US wants to liquidate Hezbollah and to tame Iran and Syria. Iraq is connected with Turkey in another way: if Kurds separate from Iraq they will threaten Turkey since it has a minority of nine million Kurds, seeking some form of liberation. Turkey is connected with Cyprus; it occupies northern part of the island. Cyprus is connected with Greece; ethnically the majority of Cypriots are Greek. Greece and Turkey are NATO members; so are the US and Europe. Turkey wants to join the European Union; it can do so if it offers freedoms for the Kurds and if it withdraws from Cyprus. The US is not in Iraq just for Iraq’s sake.

Final Word
While Iraq is a stepping-stone for reaching the region’s myriad interrelated problems, the temptation for the US will be to do too much on site. This would be a grave mistake. A brief and subtle presence would be tolerated and may bring good results. An immediate response to the Israeli Palestinian problem would strengthen the US hands in Iraq and shorten the need for an over extended and problematic presence. The UN is ready to help and so is the region. This daunting and expensive experiment in democracy building may succeed, but it may also fail miserably and cause much more damage than it has already done. The prospects for democracy in Iraq seem slim to moderate at this moment.