The Arabs should not fully outsource Libya’s liberation

Palm Beach Gardens:

Where is the role of the Arab states in a multinational effort to save Libya? The Arab League has promised to be “visible” in the third north African uprising in recent weeks. But so far, in this costly operation, Arab help has been largely symbolic. The League is a diplomatic pan-Arab body, established in 1945 to represent the twenty two Arab speaking countries in North Africa, the Near East and the Arab Gulf states. This organization has never been forceful and responsive to the needs and aspirations of the 360 million people it is supposed to serve.

The reluctance of the Arab League to be active in Libya is due to the insecurity of the rulers to whom it is accountable. The regimes that have not been shaken yet wish to stop the Arab awakening, and the regimes that have already been shaken want the process of change to be slow, painless and limited.

For several decades, the Arabs have complained about foreign military presence in their countries. Yet now, to topple a hated and universally rejected ruler, the League has shied away from direct Arab action in favor of foreign intervention.

It is indeed shameful for the Arab League to fully outsource to the outside world the thorny job of liberating an Arab country hijacked by its dictator. The League should call upon Libya’s immediate neighbors who are especially suited to help in ending this crisis.

The West and the Arab states should adopt a division of labor in resolving this crisis. With overwhelming air power, the West will hopefully manage to dismantle the military forces of Gaddafi, albeit with difficulty to avoid the expected - and in some cases regime coerced - civilian victims.

To reinforce the logistics of confrontation with the adversary and facilitate suitable nation mending, Arab boots on Arab ground are needed. Now is the time for an Egyptian battalion to march into Libya from the east and a Tunisian battalion to march from the west to finish the rule of this despot. Once the Gaddafi loyalists face their Arab neighbors on the two borders, and once they asses the full impact of overwhelming air power, they would realize the futility of their situation and surrender. Most likely, Gaddafi would then finally be handed over, dead or alive, to the intervening Arab armies.

Loyalty to the Libyan regime has been largely bought by money and privilege. With mounting and solid international intervention, it may not be long before we hear of a growing defection by the top elements of the regime, even without Arab military intervention.

Currently, two factors would serve to extend the life of the Libyan regime: hesitation by the international community to fully support the operation and Arab grumbling over the proportionality of Western intervention.

In principle, preserving the unity of a failed-state is not easy. For several weeks, the political and military control of Libya has been divided between a Tripoli partially “loyalist” region and a Benghazi beleaguered, opposition region. The opposition is weak and lacks leadership. The risk of turning a revolution into a chaotic stalemate rises with time. Libya is now on the verge of civil war, partitioning, and exposure to infiltration by undesirable foreign militias.

In these economic hard times, the Western allies also need generous Arab contributions especially from the oil rich Gulf states in order to finance such a costly operation.

By participating in the saving of a failed neighbor state, Arabs would set a new model of conflict resolution, a historic model in which the region effectively empowers failing or failed states at the right moment, with or without international support.

As the people of the Arab Middle East strive for freedom, the Arab League should begin to reflect the new aspirations of its people, and move away from parroting the ideas of insecure rulers.